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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is comprised of three essays entitled: "Breaking the law when
others do: a model of law enforcement with externalities," "The e¤ects of lawyers
career concerns on litigation," and "Overworking to win the case: Representing cases
in court and young lawyershours of work."
The rst essay studies the problem of optimal law enforcement when individuals
violating the law generate positive externalities for other violators. Studying these
externalities may be of great importance because they allow us to explain the corre-
lation in individualsdecisions to break the law. As shown in Glaeser et al. (1996),
crime rate variances are not fully explained by standard economic, social, and local
conditions. They nd that the correlation between individualscriminal behavior may
cause the rest of the crime rate variation. While previous literature has focused on
behavioral assumptions to explain such correlation (e.g., imitation among peers), this
paper shows that interdependence in the decision to break the law may occur among
rational utilty-maximizing individuals.
In the model the probability of punishing a violator depends not only on enforce-
ment resources, but also on the number of violators. Specically, the productivity of
the enforcement resources is decreasing in the number of violators due to two neigh-
borhood externalities. The rst externality is created by congestion in enforcement
resources. As the number of violators increases, the amount of resources per vio-
lator decreases and hence so does the likelihood that a violator is punished. The
second externality arises due to the key role of members of the community in en-
forcement activities.1 When the involvement of community members in enforcement
1See for instance Akerlof and Yellen (1994) and Sampson (2004) for a discussion of the deterrent
e¤ect induced by neighborscollaboration in enforcement activities.
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is decreasing in the number of criminals (e.g., due to fear of retaliation), then again
the productivity of the enforcement resources decreases as the number of violators
increases.
The paper is also related to the game theory literature, as it discusses the applica-
tion of possible equilibrium selection concepts and its limitations. Furthermore, it pro-
vides an application of the risk dominance selection criterion developed by Harsanyi
and Selten (1988). In the model, multiple equilibria arise as a consequence of the
externalities. Hence, given a level of enforcement resources, more than one crime rate
may result as an equilibrium for the continuum of individuals in the model. Further-
more, I nd that the more sensitive is the enforcement technology to the externalities,
the larger is the range of enforcement resources for which there exist multiple equi-
libria. Therefore, di¤erences in crime rates across neighborhoods may be explained
by di¤erences in how sensitive the enforcement technology is to the externalities.
I assume that the equilibrium selected is the risk dominant equilibrium. Risk
dominance seems the most suitable selection criterion in this framework; rst, because
the experimental literature has shown that it has a stronger predictive power than
Pareto dominance, second, because, as shown by Angeletos et al. (2006), the global
games model does not lead to equilibrium selection when a previous policy choice
(in my framework, the choice of enforcement resources) provides information to the
individuals, and third, because the dynamic evolutionary criterion (Young, 1993)
requires that individuals are boundedly rational.
At the risk dominant equilibrium, I nd that the lower the neighborhoods involve-
ment, the more enforcement resources are needed to induce compliance. Furthermore,
if the neighborhoods involvement is low enough, enforcing the law in that specic
neighborhood might be too costly. This e¤ect is even stronger when the neighborhood
involvement in enforcement activities is decreasing in the crime rate. Overall, di¤er-
ences in crime rates between otherwise identical neighborhoods may be explained
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by how the neighborhoods involvement a¤ects enforcement activities and by how it
decreases with the crime rate.
In terms of policy analysis, the paper provides two types of policy implications.
First, it illustrates the importance of policies that reduce the e¤ect of the congestion
externality in the enforcement technology. Examples of these policies are incentives
for voluntary payment of nes, and demerit point systems for tra¢ c violations. Sec-
ond, the results show how campaigns promoting neighborsinvolvement in community
policing can decrease the amount of resources needed for enforcement, and may facil-
itate enforcement in crime-ridden neighborhoods. Third, the results are also relevant
in terms of empirical implications. In particular, I argue that a structural model of
crime may be required when the probability of punishing a violator is endogenously
determined and when the level of enforcement resources is a strategic decision of the
law enforcement agency. For instance, it may be important to have an equation for
the choice of enforcement resources that controls for the harm associated with crime
in a specic neighborhood.
The second essay studies how career concerns may a¤ect lawyerse¤ort choices
and settlement decisions in litigation. Because career concerns induce lawyers to
provide more e¤ort in court, litigation costs may increase. Understanding the sources
of high litigation expenses is important because they a¤ect health costs, the price
of goods via product liability, and decisions related to intellectual property rights.
For instance, Lerner (1995) provides empirical evidence of how litigation costs a¤ects
rmspatenting behavior.
In the model, two lawyers, the defendants lawyer and the plainti¤s lawyer, oppose
each other in court. Each lawyer chooses how much e¤ort to exert in the case by
maximizing her payo¤function, which is increasing in the markets inference about her
talent. The outcome of the trial is informative about the attorneystalents because it
depends on their choices of e¤ort and on their talents. Thus, lawyers have incentives to
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exert more e¤ort at trial because in addition to the explicit incentives, each attempts
to a¤ect the markets inference about her talent by winning the case. As a benchmark,
I solve the case in which lawyers are symmetric. Then, I let the two lawyers di¤er in
how much they care about the markets inference (i.e., in the strength of their career
concerns), in what is the initial prior over their talents, and in their cost functions.
Although there is a large economics literature on litigation, little is known about
the e¤ect of lawyers reputational concerns. Career concerns were introduced in a
one-principal one-agent model by Fama (1980) and Holmström (1999) to study how
such concerns mitigate the moral hazard problem. I contribute to this literature by
studying the strategic interactions of two agents opposing each other, and by consid-
ering settlement and other specic features of the litigation models, such as di¤erent
possible contracts between lawyers and clients. As is standard in this literature, I
assume that the agents (the two lawyers) have uncertainty about their own talents.
Specically, there is imperfect but symmetric information in the model.
The results show that career concerns create an equilibrium e¤ort trap for the
two opposing attorneys. Also, I nd that starting from an equilibrium where the two
of them care the same about the marketsinference, increasing the career concerns
of one of the lawyers implies that her equilibrium e¤ort level is higher than the one
from the other lawyer. Furthermore, the other lawyer also increases her equilibrium
e¤ort level (although to a lesser extent) even though her career concerns remain
unchanged. That is, in equilibrium a lawyers e¤ort choice depends not only on her
career concerns but on the opposing lawyers career concerns. I also nd a similar
result when I compare the symmetric equilibrium with the equilibrium e¤ort levels
when the uncertainty over the talent of one of the attorneys is larger (letting the prior
average talent be the same for both lawyers).
In the settlement stage each lawyer anticipates her choice of e¤ort in case of
trial. In this model, the court costs depend on the choice of e¤ort and thus are
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endogenous. Since stronger career concerns imply higher equilibrium e¤ort levels,
the scope for settlement is increasing in the strength of the lawyerscareer concerns.
Starting again from an equilibrium where the two opposing attorneys care the same
about their career concerns, increasing the career concerns of one of the attorneys
implies that the attorney with unchanged career concerns may accept a less benecial
settlement o¤er than in the initial equilibrium. Notice that the lawyer with stronger
career concerns has a higher expected probability of winning the trial because her
equilibrium e¤ort level is higher. Also, the lawyer with weaker career concerns exerts
more e¤ort than in the initial equilibrium, and therefore has higher court costs. Thus,
the expected payo¤ of going to trial decreases as the career concerns of the opposing
lawyer increase.
The third essay is an empirical study analyzing some of theoretical results from
the second essay. In particular I provide empirical evidence of the equilibrium e¤ort
trap for trial lawyers. In the essay, I use survey data from the "After the JD study,"
a project funded by the American Bar Foundation and other legal associations, to
test whether there is a signicant di¤erence between the hours of work of lawyers
representing cases in court (treatment group) and other young practicing lawyers
working in law rms (control group). I focus on young lawyers because previous
research has shown that the e¤ect of career concerns is stronger for younger workers.
Also to focus on lawyers with career concerns, I exclude lawyers working part-time
or for the government.
Previous empirical research has studied lawyersearnings, particularly gender dif-
ferences, but little is known about the determinants of lawyershours of work. An
exception is Landers et al. (1996) that nds evidence of associate lawyers working too
many hours, in the sense that they generally preferred a decrease in hours of work to
an increase in their wage. The authors argue that law rms induce lawyers to over-
work as a screening device. Their framework assumes that law rms wish to identify
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which are the lawyers with a lower taste for leisure, which is private information of
the lawyers, to make them partners of the rm. Since lawyerstaste for leisure may
change over time (e.g., if they have children), I study whether lawyers work more
hours even when there is no signaling or screening involved.
I nd that lawyers that represent cases in court work nearly ve more hours than
the rest of lawyers working full-time in law rms. The result is highly signicant and
robust to a variety of specications. For the ndings I use average treatment e¤ect
estimation under the ignorability-of-treatment assumption. To relax this assumption,
I introduce an alternative dependent variable (hours of work beyond expected) that
allows me to control for unobservable heterogeneities among the lawyers. The results
suggest that lawyers representing cases in court work more hours than the rest due to
incentive e¤ects rather than to selection e¤ects. In addition, I construct instrumental
variables for the lawyersannual salary since it could be endogenous and a¤ect the
estimates. When using the instruments for annual salary, the di¤erence between the
treatment and the control group is even larger, slightly above ve hours per week.
Finally, I nd no evidence of a possible sample selection bias in my analysis.
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CHAPTER II
BREAKING THE LAW WHEN OTHERS DO: A MODEL OF LAW
ENFORCEMENT WITH NEIGHBORHOOD EXTERNALITIES
Introduction
Socioeconomic conditions of poverty, inequality, education and unemployment do
not fully explain the di¤erences in crime rates across locations. Such di¤erences in
crime rates remain an open question in the law enforcement literature. This paper
studies an alternative explanation that regards the interdependence of individuals
decisions to break the law as an important source of the variance in rates of com-
pliance. In contrast to previous work that focuses on behavioral assumptions,2 this
paper demonstrates that such interdependence can also arise from conventional as-
sumptions of rational utility maximizing behavior.3
Standard theories of the economics of law enforcement assume that the likelihood
that a violator is punished depends only on the level of resources that are devoted
to enforcement. However, it is often true that the productivity of enforcement re-
sources depends upon the number of people that engage in the illegal activity.4 This
paper considers two positive externalities among o¤enders that may explain neigh-
borhood di¤erentiation. By a¤ecting the productivity of enforcement resources, these
externalities create interdependence between individualsdecisions to violate the law.
As shown below, these externalities must be accounted for in evaluating individual
payo¤s from violating the law because they have a considerable e¤ect on optimal en-
forcement policy. One externality is caused by congestion in enforcement. It creates
2See for instance Glaeser et al. (1996) and Sah (1991), which are discussed below.
3This interdependence results in multiple equilibria. I will use a renement to select among them;
this is discussed in Section 4.2.
4The outcome of the enforcement process is the likelihood that a violator is punished. Thus,
the enforcement resourcesproductivity is measured in terms of that likelihood, or consequently, in
terms of the resulting crime rate.
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a positive externality among o¤enders because (for a xed level of enforcement re-
sources) an increase in the number of violators leads to a lower amount of enforcement
resources per violator, yielding a lower likelihood that a violator is punished. This
case arises when enforcement resources are needed for punishment and detection ac-
tivities, rather than for detection alone. For example, if there is only one tow-truck in
the neighborhood, an increase in the number of cars that are illegally-parked reduces
the probability that a given car is towed since there are fewer enforcement resources
(tow-trucks) per violator. In the model the number of violators is determined in
equilibrium; hence, the magnitude of this externality is generated endogenously.
The second externality is caused by the communitys degree of involvement in
enforcement activities. The role of citizens in the enforcement process is important
since they may alert authorities, provide evidence, and denounce o¤enders.5 Thus,
the productivity of enforcement resources increases in the communitys degree of
involvement. First, I consider the degree of involvement as an exogenous characteristic
of the neighborhood; this allows me to discuss the e¤ect of policies that may change
this degree of involvement. Second, a section of the paper extends the results to
the case in which neighborhood involvement is a decreasing function of the non-
compliance rate (and thus, being determined endogenously), as is the case when
non-compliers may retaliate against neighbors who provide information to police.
The probability of punishing a violator is determined endogenously depending on
the enforcement resources and on individualsdecisions in equilibrium. A functional
form for this probability permits me to evaluate the e¤ects of the externalities. The
results show that the externalities have crucial e¤ects on optimal law enforcement pol-
icy. First, they create multiple equilibria; thus, more than one compliance level may
5For instance, Akerlof and Yellen (1994) argue that "the major deterrent to crime is not an active
police presence but rather the presence of knowledgeable civilians, prepared to report crimes and
cooperate in police investigations." In a model of gang behavior, Akerlof and Yellen (1994) study the
optimal level of cooperation of a community. However, there are no externalities across criminals
because their behavior is modeled by a representative gang that chooses the intensity of criminal
activity.
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result for a given amount of enforcement resources. To nd the optimal enforcement
policy, the enforcement agency must be able to identify which of the equilbria will
be selected. As I argue, risk dominance seems the most suitable selection criterion in
this framework. After one equilibrium has been selected, the e¤ects of the externali-
ties remain. In particular, they may cause enforcement to be too costly, which helps
explain how some neighborhoods become no-gozones for police.
In such cases, an alternative is to enforce the law through community policing. The
paper formally models how di¤erences in the involvement in enforcement activities
between two otherwise identical neighborhoods may create a divergence in crime rates.
Other alternatives are policies that make apprehension and punishment depend less
on the number of violators. Examples of these types of policies for tra¢ c violations
are demerit point systems and electronic citation programs.
The model is presented in Section 2. As a benchmark, Section 3 provides the
results when there are no externalities. Section 4 solves the model with externalities.
Section 5 studies other possible neighborhood externalities and discusses the case
where congestion is the only externality. Section 6 extends the model to a framework
with heterogeneous individuals. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
Glaeser et al. (1996) show that the variance of crime rates clearly exceeds what
one would predict considering observable socioeconomic characteristics.6 Further-
more, they show that, with the exception of murders and rapes, such variance can
be explained by the correlation of agentsdecisions. To interpret such correlation the
authors use a behavioral model where a fraction of the population simply imitates
their neighbors. In an earlier behavioral model Sah (1991) also studies how individ-
ualsdecisions to violate the law may be interdependent. In his model, individuals
6Unemployment rate, high school dropout rate, property taxes per capita, police per capita,
regional dummy variable, persons over age of 25, etc.
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respond to the "perception" of the likelihood of the punishment rather than to the
true likelihood which implies that each individual chooses whether to be a criminal
depending on her own and her acquaintancespast experiences.
In contrast with these behavioral models, I show how individualsdecisions may
be interdependent (which generates multiple equilibria) in a framework where all indi-
viduals are utility maximizers. As discussed above, such interdependence arises when
the crime rate is a "negative input" on criminal apprehension system. In an empiri-
cal study on crime, Ehrlich (1973) showed that the probability of apprehending and
convicting felons is not only positively related to the level of current police resources,
but also negatively related to the crime rate. He argued that the productivity of
the resources "is likely to be lower at higher levels of criminal activity because more
o¤enders must then be apprehended, charged and tried in court in order to achieve
a given level of P [probability of the sanction]." However, much of the literature on
the economics of law enforcement does not allow for this kind of externality among
criminals.
One notable exception is Freeman, Grogger and Sonstelie (1996).7 In a model
with two neighborhoods, they study the tradeo¤s between two externalities across
criminals: when the number of thieves increases, the probability of being arrested
decreases while the returns of crime decrease because there is less to steal. They nd
multiple equilibria; in particular, one possible equilibrium is that crime may concen-
trate in one neighborhood instead of spreading to the other. My work di¤ers from
theirs in several ways. First, rather than taking enforcement resources as exogenous,
I take these enforcement resources as strategically determined by the enforcement
7Another exception is Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) which discusses in detail several ways in which
the crime rate might feed back into the expected sanction. They argue that the expected sanction
could be a decreasing function of the crime rate, either because of resource congestion or due to
learning from fellow criminals; this is also the approach taken in this paper. They also note the
possibility of multiple equilibria, but they do not characterize the full set of equilibria nor select
among them. In addition to characterizing and selecting among equilibria, my analysis also di¤ers
from Bar-Gill and Harel in that I use a parametrized functional form for the enforcement technology
that allows me to vary the sensitivity of the technology to the externalities.
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agency, which is an active agent of the model. Second, my model considers also the
externality that arises through the involvement of the neighborhood in enforcement
activities, and assumes that returns from illegal behavior do not decrease in the num-
ber of criminals. Third, I study further e¤ects of the externalities by introducing
criteria of equilibrium selection. After adopting a criterion of equilibrium selection, I
show that it matters how sensitive the enforcement technology is to the externalities;
in particular, it is crucial in determining the optimal enforcement policy. This re-
sult is particularly relevant because Glaeser et al. (1996) argue that, although crime
models with multiple equilibria generate a higher variance in the crime rate than do
other models, the existence of multiple equilibria is not enough to explain the high
variance in crime rates.8 In their data, they show that di¤erences in crime rate across
communities (once they control for socioeconomic conditions) cannot be explained by
crime rates clustering around a few possible equilibria.
After Ehrlich (1973), the empirical literature on crime has continued studying the
relationship between the likelihood of the punishment and the crime rate. In general,
these studies nd a signicant negative relationship between the crime rate and the
arrest rate (the usual proxy for the likelihood of the punishment). As discussed
in Levitt (1998) and Ehrlich (1996) there are several empirical di¢ culties in these
studies that complicate the empirical analysis. In particular, two of the empirical
problems are related to the externalities discussed in this paper. First, regressing
crime rates on arrest rates may suggest a (spurious) correlation when the arrest rate
is also a¤ected by the crime rate. Second, there may be a measurement error when
8The literature on illegal behavior has studied other causes of multiple equilibria. In Schrag and
Scotchmer (1997), when the crime rate is high, individualslikelihood to be punished is almost the
same regardless of being innocent or guilty, thus it is actually rational for an individual to commit a
crime only when the crime rate is high. Because of the multiple equilibria, the authors conclude that
the crime rate cannot be predicted from the enforcement policy and do not undertake an analysis
of optimal law enforcement. In Rasmusen (1996) employers have incomplete information about
workerscriminal activity. Multiple equilibria arise because the stigma of being convicted (reduction
in the wage employers are willing to pay someone with a criminal record) decreases with the crime
rate. Similarly, Silverman (2004) nds multiple equilibria in a model where committing a crime is
benecial in terms of "street reputation."
11
using the arrest rates to proxy the likelihood of the punishment because it might not
provide enough information about the ratio of criminals that are e¤ectively punished.
More specically, using the arrest rates leaves out the possibility of congestion during
the investigation and conviction process, which may have important implications as
shown in this paper. Although Glaeser et al. (1996) focus on showing the importance
of the interactions across individuals and not the form of that interaction or the
mechanisms that aid that interaction, they believe congestion is not the form of
interaction because they do not nd a correlation between arrest rates and crime
rates in New York City precincts. However, as just mentioned, a spurious correlation
problem may arise when studying the relationship between these two variables.
With this paper I intend to provide further insights on how enforcement resources,
the crime rate, and other factors determine the likelihood of the punishment. Ehrlich
(1996) considers this production functionas an essential part of the simultaneous
equations econometric structure needed to study illegal behavior and law enforce-
ment. Moreover, my analysis points out two additional challenges in the empirical
analysis. First, there may exist threshold levels of enforcement resources that make
the individuals behavior vary drastically. In such cases, increases in enforcement
resources below that threshold level might not result in meaningful changes in the
crime rate, which might make the estimation more di¢ cult. Second, when the level
of enforcement resources is a strategic decision of the enforcement agency, a separate
regression equation might be needed to model this decision. For instance, it would
be interesting to study how the harm caused by the criminal activities (measured
through victimization costs) a¤ects the choice of level of enforcement resources.
In what follows I will assume that the ne is xed exogenously, so that the level of
enforcement resources is the sole decision variable of the enforcement agency.9 This
9According to Beckers (1968) seminal study on crime and punishment (see also Stigler, 1970), op-
timal enforcement involves the highest possible ne and the lowest possible apprehension probability
that are consistent with the desired expected sanction. Others have argued that less-than-maximal
nes may be optimal when more complicated incentives are involved. Stigler (1970) and Mookher-
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is reasonable because the ne is set by a legislative body (or perhaps by judicial
precedent) with broad jurisdiction, while the level of enforcement resources is chosen
at a more local level and through a shorter-term process. Notice that although the
total amount of enforcement resources might be decided at a supralocal level (e.g.,
decided by the state), urban and local authorities may decide how those resources are
distributed across neighborhoods or communities within their area.
The Model
The basic structure of the model is similar to Polinsky and Shavell (1979). There
is an enforcement agency that aims at maximizing social welfare and a continuum of
risk neutral utility-maximizing individuals.
The individuals
There is a continuum of risk-neutral individuals of measure 1, which represents the
population of potential o¤enders.10 Individuals are assumed to be homogenous in the
main model; this assumption is relaxed in Section 6. Each of the individuals may
either comply with the law, denoted as {C}, which yields zero payo¤, or not comply
with the law, denoted as {NC}, which implies a benet, b, but also a possible ne,
f > 0. The ne is imposed with a probability P that is determined endogenously as
explained below. The benet is net of any cost (excluding the ne) associated with
not complying (e.g., moral cost). Both b and f are exogenous to the model. I assume
that b < f; that is, there is always a high enough probability, P  b=f; that deters
individuals from violating the law.
The choice of a single individual has a negligible impact on the crime rate; therefore
it has no e¤ect on P . Thus, an individual commits an o¤ense if P < b=f , but not
jee (1994) invoke the need for marginal deterrence; Polinsky and Shavell (1979) and Block and
Sidak (1980) include costs associated with risk-bearing; and Malik (1990) includes avoidance and/or
collection costs that increase with the magnitude of the ne.
10Although every individual could be considered as a potential criminal, some individuals are
deterred by very small levels of enforcement resources due, for instance, to moral costs. Thus, I am
excluding them from the analysis.
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if P > b=f; and will be indi¤erent if P = b=f: In order to simplify the exposition, I
maintain the following assumption11:
ASSUMPTION 1: Individuals comply with the law in case of indi¤erence.
Therefore, the proportion of individuals not complying is given by a function of
the probability of the sanction,  = R(P ) where:
R(P ) =
8><>: 1 if P < b=f0 if P  b=f : (1)
The enforcement agency
The enforcement agency maximizes social welfare by choosing the amount of en-
forcement resources c  0. The sanction associated with non-compliance, f > 0, is
exogenous for reasons explained in the Introduction. Therefore the decision variable
of the agency is the level of enforcement resources, c, which includes all the needed
expenses in detecting, prosecuting, and ning, so that the ne is actually imposed.
Hence, c describes the public resources that are used for enforcement activities.
Social welfare is measured by considering that rst, non-compliance should be
deterred because each individual not complying with the law generates a harm, h, to
the community, and that second, (for a xed level of aggregate harm) the lower the
expenditure on enforcement the better o¤ society is. For a given non-compliance rate,
denoted above as ; the harm generated is h  : In addition, the nes are assumed
to be mere transfers of money and hence the revenue obtained from them does not
a¤ect the choice of the agency. Therefore, the enforcement policy that maximizes
social welfare is given by:
copt = argmax
c
SW (c) = argmin
c
h(c) + c; (2)
11I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this assumption. For a model that involves mixed
strategies, see Ferrer (2008).
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where (c) is the equilibrium non-compliance rate among individuals who are con-
templating crime.
The timing of the decisions of the agency and of the individuals is:
Stage 1: The agency decides how much to spend on enforcement, c.
Stage 2: Individuals decide whether or not to comply with the law.
The agency anticipates the behavior of the individuals since it has perfect information
about the individualspayo¤s.
The enforcement technology
The enforcement technology consists of the process that determines the probability
of a law-violator being sanctioned, P . Therefore, it assembles all the activities related
to detection, apprehension and punishment.
The probability of the sanction, P , is not a (direct) decision variable of the agency
and it will be determined endogenously. Given the enforcement resources, c; a non-
compliance rate, ; and a measure of neighborhood involvement, denoted , the prob-
ability of being sanctioned is given by P = p(c; ; ). The triple (c; ; ) 2 R+ [0; 1]
[0; 1) and the function p is increasing in c and  and decreasing in .
Because of the positive externality among o¤enders, the enforcement technology is
such that the higher the non-compliance rate, the lower the probability of the sanction
(i.e., p < 0).12 This positive externality among o¤enders arises due to congestion
in enforcement resources. Also, it could arise when o¤enders share information or
techniques on how to avoid detection and punishment. Since the non-compliance rate
is determined in equilibrium, the magnitude of this externality is endogenous in the
12In this paper, the externality among o¤enders is always positive. In contrast, Calvó-Armengol
and Zenou (2004) consider a model of social networks in which there is a negative externality
among delinquents because they compete in criminal activities. Competition in criminal activities
commonly arises in environments of organized crime, however, in other illegal activities there is
usually no (signicant) booty to ght for. Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) also discuss the possibility of a
negative externality among o¤enders. While this negative externality is certainly possible, it would
predict a negative correlation in criminal behavior, which seems to be at odds with the available
evidence.
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model.
In addition, the involvement of a neighborhood in enforcement is measured by
. The information that members of the community have plays an important role
in the enforcement process since they may alert authorities, provide evidence, and
denounce o¤enders. That is, since such information has an e¤ect on the productivity
of enforcement: the higher is the involvement of neighbors in enforcement, the higher
the probability of the sanction (i.e., p > 0).13 Diverse factors and policies may a¤ect
the value of this parameter. For instance, language di¤erences between the police and
the neighbors may decrease the level of neighborsinvolvement. First I consider  as
exogenously given for each neighborhood. Section 4.4 extends the results to the case
where  is decreasing in ; that is, to the case where the neighborsinvolvement is
decreasing in the non-compliance rate.
In order to have closed-form solutions for the optimal level of enforcement re-
sources, a particular functional form for p is employed. A second advantage of as-
suming a specic functional form is that it allows me to measure the results in terms
of the sensitivity of the technology to the externalities. A specic functional form
is a restrictive assumption; however, the form assumed represents a large family of
functions and satises desirable properties.
The probability of the sanction is given by the following function dened over the
enforcement resources and the non-compliance rate14:
P = p(c; ; ) = kc=(1 +   ): (3)
The parameters of this production function are k > 0; which expresses additional
factors that may a¤ect the enforcement technology such as specic characteristics of
13Sampson (2004) nds evidence that "exposes the centrality of citizens as the engine of crime
control."
14I will make the necessary parametric assumptions in order to ensure that P 2 [0; 1]. In particular,
I impose that P = 1 when the level of enforcement resources is c > ((1 +    )=k)1=: Footnote
(18) discusses the implications when modeling the equilibrium selection.
16
the type of illegal behavior; and  2 (0; 1) ; which implies that there are decreasing
returns with respect to the level of enforcement resources (i.e., pcc < 0). Also, 1+ 
measures the overall neighborhood e¤ect. Finally,  2 (0; 1) measures how sensitive
the technology is to the externalities. Notice that   is the elasticity of p with respect
to the overall neighborhood e¤ect 1+  : In the limiting case of  = 0, then  and
 have no e¤ect on the probability of the sanction, and P depends only on the level
of enforcement resources. This case will be used as a benchmark. Furthermore, if the
rate of community involvement is higher than the crime rate (i.e.,  > ) then the net
e¤ect of the externalities is positive for enforcement since then p > 0. Alternatively,
the externalities have a negative net e¤ect when the rate of community involvement
is lower than the crime rate (i.e.,  < ) because then p < 0: In Section 5, I study
the case in which congestion is the only externality; that is, the case where  = 0:
This specic functional form aggregates the two distinct neighborhood e¤ects (
and ) into an overall neighborhood e¤ect; let N      denote this overall e¤ect.
By employing this specic functional form, I impose assumptions on the signs of the
second cross-partial derivatives of the enforcement technology. Thus, pcN < 0; that
is, a higher overall neighborhood e¤ect (due to either an increase in the crime rate or
a decrease in community involvement) reduces the marginal productivity of expendi-
tures on enforcement. The e¤ect of the externalities on the marginal productivity of
enforcement expenditures is given by pc > 0 if  <  and pc < 0 if  > . That is,
if the crime rate is lower than the rate of community involvement, then the marginal
productivity of enforcement expenditures is decreased by the presence of the external-
ities, while if the crime rate is higher than the rate of community involvement, then
the marginal productivity of enforcement expenditures is decreased by the presence of
the externalities. Finally, pN < 0; that is, the overall neighborhood e¤ect is stronger
when the enforcement technology is more sensitive to the externalities. While these
implications about the signs of cross-partial derivatives seem plausible, they are not
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crucial for the main results of the paper.15
Equilibrium condition for the individualsbehavior
Because of the positive externality among o¤enders, each individual cares about the
rest of the individualsdecisions with respect to compliance. Therefore an individuals
equilibrium is only reached when, given the non-compliance rate, no individual is
willing to change her decision as to whether to comply or not.
Denition 1 : Given the enforcement resources, c, the non-compliance rate  2
[0; 1] is an equilibrium for the individualsbehavior if it satises the following
condition:  = R(p(c; ; )): That is, the non-compliance rate  is consistent with
the probability of the sanction resulting from c enforcement resources and a non-
compliance rate :
Given , the equilibrium condition for individualsbehavior can be rewritten as a
function of the enforcement resources, c; through the following function  : [0; 1]!
[0; 1] :
(c; ) =
8><>: 0 if p(c; 0; )  b=f1 if p(c; 1; ) < b=f : (4)
15In particular, the existence of multiple equilibria, and a unique risk-dominant equilibrium, also
hold when P is determined by a generic di¤erentiable function such that for any  and ; p(c; ; )
is strictly increasing, surjective, and strictly concave in c.
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The benchmark: optimal policy in the absence of externalities
The analysis excluding externalities (i.e., when imposing  = 0) provides the
results obtained in the standard law enforcement literature. For this reason, the
results of this section are used as a benchmark. Notice that when  = 0, p becomes a
one-to-one, increasing and concave function of the enforcement resources, c; alone. For
any given c; p(c) is uniquely determined, independent of the rate of non-compliance:
P = p(c) = kc for all c  0: (5)
Whenever  = 0; each individual complies or not with the law depending only
on the enforcement resources, since other individualschoices have no e¤ect on her
payo¤ function. Notice that there is a level of enforcement resources that constitutes
a threshold for the individuals.
Denition 2 Let ~c  0 be such that p(~c) = b
f
is satised. I refer to ~c as the threshold
level of enforcement resources in the absence of the externalities.
Considering the functional form of p; notice that ~c = (b=fk)1= and p(~c)  1. Thus,
the individualsnon-compliance rate in equilibrium can be rewritten as a function of
c. In order to nd the optimal enforcement policy let me rst nd the equilibrium of
the second stage. For any c  0; the equilibrium of the individualsbehavior is given
by:
(c) =
8><>: 1 if c < ~c0 if c  ~c : (6)
Therefore, the equilibrium of the individualsbehavior is unique for any given c. The
agency anticipates the behavior of the individuals and chooses the optimal policy
19
according to it. Therefore, the optimal policy of the enforcement agency, copt ; is
obtained by backwards induction:
copt = argmin
c
h(c) + c: (7)
From the second stage, it is clear that the agency will either invest c = 0 so that
 = 1 or c = ~c so that  = 0: This decision will be based on how large is h, the
harm imposed to the community. If the agency chooses c = 0, then the welfare is
equal to h(c) + c = h while if it choose c = ~c; the h(c) + c = ~c: Thus, we have
the following result:
Proposition 3 In the absence of the externalities, equilibrium enforcement and com-
pliance can be characterized as follows:
i) If ~c > h the agency will spend copt = 0; which yields a no-compliance equilibrium,
opt = 1:
ii) If ~c < h the agency will spend copt = ~c; which yields a full-compliance equilibrium,
opt = 0.
iii) If ~c = h then the agency is indi¤erent between spending copt = ~c; which induces
a full-compliance equilibrium, opt = 0; and spending copt = 0; which induces a no-
compliance equilibrium, opt = 1:
Considering zero enforcement resources as optimal (as is the case in the model for
certain parameter values) or having equilibrium rates with either full or no compliance
may seem unusual in real life. However, let me emphasize that  measures the
compliance rate among potential criminals. There may be many members of the
community that do not behave illegally even when enforcement resources are very
low (for instance because illegal behavior has strong moral costs for them) and thus
are outside of my analysis. In any case, Section 6 extends the model to a framework
where the potential o¤enders are heterogeneous.
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Law enforcement under the externalities
As already discussed in subsection 2.3, the enforcement technology depends on its
sensitivity to the externalities, , and on their net e¤ect,    : Recall that p < 0
when  >  and p > 0 when  < : That is, the presence of externalities decreases
the probability of sanction if the noncompliance rate exceeds the rate of commu-
nity involvement, and increases the probability of sanction if the rate of community
involvement exceeds the non-compliance rate.
The individualsbehavior: multiple equilibria
In contrast with the benchmark, whenever  > 0 the probability of the sanction
depends also on the non-compliance rate. Then the decision of an individual with
respect to compliance depends on other individualschoices. When the individual
decides not to comply, her utility is given by b   p(c; ; )f: Hence, an individual
may decide to comply with the law when the non-compliance rate is low (which
yields a larger value of p(c; ; )) and not to comply when the non-compliance rate is
high (because it yields a smaller value of p(c; ; )).
Denition 4 Let c  0 be such that p(c; 0; ) = b
f
. I refer to c as the minimal
enforcement resources needed to reach P = b=f .
That is, c is the level of enforcement resources needed to make individuals indif-
ferent between compliance and non-compliance when the rate of non-compliance is
zero: For the functional form specied for p, c = (b(1  )=fk)1= :
Denition 5 Let c  0 be such that p(c; 1; ) = b
f
. I refer to c as the maximal
enforcement resources needed to reach P = b=f .
That is, c is the level of enforcement resources needed to make individuals indif-
ferent between compliance and non-compliance when the rate of non-compliance is 1:
21
For the functional form specied for p, c = (b(2  )=fk)1= : Thus, for  2 [0; 1):
c  ~c < c: (8)
Notice that if the agency is not able to benet from the information of the neighbors
(i.e.,  = 0) then c coincides with ~c: The equilibria for the individualsbehavior can
be characterized in terms of c and c as shown in Figure 1. Notice that for c < c
and for c  c the individualsequilibria coincides with those of the benchmark case.
First, for c < c; no compliance ( = 1) is the unique equilibrium possible, since by
denition of c; if c < c then p(c; ; ) < b
f
for all ; hence it is optimal for the
individuals to violate the law. Second, for c > c; full compliance ( = 0) is the
unique equilibrium possible since by denition of c; if c > c then p(c; ; ) > b
f
for
all ; hence it is optimal for all individuals to comply. Finally, full compliance is also
the unique equilibria for c = c since I have assumed that individuals comply with the
law in case of indi¤erence.
m
1
cc = cc ~= cc = c
Individuals’
equilibria without the
externalities
Additional
individuals’ equilibria
under the externalities
Figure 1: Equilibria of the individuals
However, because of the externalities there is an interval [c; c) of enforcement
resources for which individualsequilibria di¤er from the benchmark. In particular,
as shown in Figure 1, for this interval of resources there are multiple equilibria.
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Proposition 6 For any level of enforcement resources c 2 [c; c):
i) There exists a no-compliance equilibrium,  = 1.
ii) There exists a full-compliance equilibrium,  = 0:
Furthermore, the length of the interval [c; c) is increasing in :
Proof. See the Appendix
Due to the presence of externalities, more than one equilibrium arises for a given
amount of enforcement resources c 2 [c; c): Intuitively, because the net e¤ect of the
externalities on enforcement may be positive, some of the new equilibria that arise
are good equilibria from the perspective of the enforcement agency. In particular,
full-compliance equilibria can now be sustained for levels of enforcement resources
below the threshold ~c:
Furthermore, since a larger  results in a smaller c and a larger c; there is more
scope for multiple equilibria the more sensitive the technology is to the externalities.
In other words, a higher elasticity of the enforcement technology with respect to the
overall neighborhood e¤ect implies a larger range of enforcement resources for which
there are multiple equilibria.
Equilibrium selection
As just shown, multiple equilibria arise for any given c in the range [c; c). The
full-compliance equilibrium is the socially desirable one; however, it may be that it is
not the equilibrium selected by the individuals. In this subsection I discuss possible
selection criteria and characterize the risk-dominant equilibrium, as it seems to be the
most compelling criterion. The concept of risk dominance (Harsanyi and Selten,1988)
consists of individuals choosing the less risky equilibrium action, incorporating each
individuals uncertainty about the strategy that the rest will end up choosing in
equilibrium.16 Given c 2 [c; c); notice that choosing not to comply is a risky strategy
16For a recent application of risk dominance in a law and economics setting, see Spier (2002).
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for the individuals since the rest of individuals might choose to comply. In particular,
the higher is c, the higher is this strategic risk.
Alternative equilibrium selection methods are the global gamesapproach (intro-
duced by Carlsson and van Damme, 1993), Young (1993)s dynamic evolutionary
process, or assuming payo¤ dominance as a focal point. As shown in Angeletos, Hell-
wig, and Pavan (2006), policy analysis in global games is quite complex. In a global
game, a unique equilibrium is selected when agents have heterogeneous information
about the payo¤ structure. However, Angeletos et al. (2006) show that there is no
equilibrium selection when the policy choice a¤ects that uncertainty by signaling some
information.17 Alternatively, the dynamic evolutionary model assumes that agents
are boundedly rational in the sense that they have an incomplete knowledge of re-
cent precedents(Young, 1993, page 75). Thus, I nd that risk dominance is a more
compelling equilibrium selection criterion. Also, it is important to note that both the
global games approach and Young (1993)s dynamic evolutionary model select the
risk-dominant equilibrium in 2 x 2 coordination games.
Finally, in comparison with payo¤ dominance, risk dominance seems to be a more
adequate criterion for this framework. Recent experimental ndings (van Huyck et al,
1990; Straub, 1995; and Schmidt et al., 2003) have shown the di¢ culty players have in
coordinating to reach the payo¤-dominant equilibrium, and also the important role of
risk dominance in explaining individualsbehavior in coordination games. Moreover,
there is not a clear payo¤-dominant equilibrium in the model when the incidence of
harm is taken into consideration. At the no-compliance equilibrium, each individual
attains a payo¤:
b  p(c; ;  = 1)  f > 0 for c < c: (9)
17In my framework, if agents had uncertainty about k, then asymmetric uncertainty among the
individuals would lead to the selection of a unique equilibrium. However, multiple equilibria would
arise again when the choice of enforcement resources conveys information about k (i.e., when the
choice of c signals the type of k to the individuals).
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Thus, it appears that the no-compliance equilibrium payo¤dominates the full-compliance
equilibrium since the latter yields a payo¤ of zero. However, such a comparison does
not consider that the harm caused by non-compliance,  h, may a¤ect the payo¤s of
the individuals even though it does not a¤ect their decision-making processes.18 Each
individual takes the risk of harm as given and including it does not alter the optimal
responses of the individuals; however, it may a¤ect their payo¤s. For instance, living
in a neighborhood where illegal behavior is the rule might make individuals worse
o¤, but it will not keep them from breaking the law when it is optimal for them
individually.
This problem is not new in game theory. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argue that,
for rational individuals, transformations of the game that do not a¤ect their best-
response correspondences should not a¤ect which equilibrium is considered as focal.
Payo¤ dominance does not satisfy this requirement. In contrast, as explained by
Harsanyi and Selten (1988) and by Myerson (1991), risk dominance is a solution
concept that is invariant to changes in the agentspayo¤s that do not a¤ect their
best-response correspondences.
The risk-dominance selection concept is typically applied in the context of two
player games, while in this context there is (formally) a continuum of players. How-
ever, the setup of the model allows us to easily interpret individualsbehavior as a
game with two players and two strategies per player. Consider the decision process
of an individual i by interpreting the model as a 2 x 2 game where all other players
are represented by a "representative agent." Thus, individual i decides whether to
comply or not, and his payo¤ depends on the strategy chosen by a representative
agent that reects the choice of the rest of the potential o¤enders. Because there is
a continuum of individuals the contribution of individual is choice to the payo¤ of
the representative agent is negligible. As a consequence, the non-compliance rate is
18Section 5 studies the case where the individualsdecisions are a¤ected by the harm from criminal
activities because it a¤ects non-criminals more than criminals.
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0 whenever the representative individual decides to comply and 1 when she decides
not to comply.
TABLE 1: Payoffs for individual i when ? is exogenous
Representative individual
PAYOFFS FOR
INDIVIDUAL i COMPLY NOT COMPLY
COMPLY 0 0
In
di
vi
du
al
 i
NOT
COMPLY c
a
h)1( -
-
kfcb c
a
h)2( -
-
kfcb
Payo¤s for individual i are shown in Table 1. Under risk dominance each individ-
uals strategy consists of the best response when assigning a positive probability to
the possibility of other individuals choosing the non-equilibrium strategy (i.e., there
is a risk that the rest of the individuals will choose to comply when the individual
has chosen not to comply or vice versa): Given the enforcement resources, individu-
als choose the risk-dominant strategy. As a consequence, the following equilibrium
selection takes place.
Proposition 7 There exists a level of enforcement resources c 2 (c; c); such that:
i) For any enforcement policy c < c the no-compliance equilibrium is risk dominant.
ii) For any enforcement policy c > c the full-compliance equilibrium is risk dominant.
iii) For an enforcement policy c = c; there is not a risk dominant equilibrium.
Furthermore, c is decreasing in  and is invariant to including the harm caused by
non-compliance in the individualspayo¤s.
Proof. See the Appendix
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For each level of enforcement resources, risk dominance makes one of the equilibria
focal, but which one depends on resources being above or below a level of enforcement
resources c.19 In particular, c is increasing in ; b and , and decreasing in k and
f .
Thus, whenever ~c < c the externalities imply that more resources are needed to
enforce the law. In contrast, whenever ~c > c the externalities allow enforcement of
the law with fewer resources.
Policy implications
The problem of the enforcement agency can be solved by maximizing social welfare.
Proposition 8 In the presence of the externalities, equilibrium enforcement and
compliance can be characterized as follows:
i) If c > h the optimal enforcement resources are copt = 0; which yields a no-
compliance equilibrium, opt = 1:
ii) If c < h the optimal enforcement resources are copt = c, which yields a full-
compliance equilibrium, opt = 0:
iii) If c = h then the agency is indi¤erent between spending copt = c; which in-
duces a full-compliance equilibrium, opt = 0; and spending copt = 0; which induces a
no-compliance equilibrium, opt = 1:
Proof. The proof is straightforward once the results from the previous proposition
are inserted into the social welfare function. Note that full compliance must follow
an expenditure of c in order in order for there to be an equilibrium at c.
Therefore, there are values of h for which the externalities have relevant policy
implications. Comparing this result with Proposition 1 illustrates the impact of the
19In order to ensure that p(c; ; )  1 for all ; then I impose b=f  12 + (1 )

(2 ) : This condition
guarantees that c  ((1 +   )=k) which, as discussed in footnote (13), is the level of resources
such that p(c; ; ) = 1:
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externalities on the optimal enforcement policy. First, for the case where ~c < c
and whenever ~c < h < c; it is optimal to enforce the law only when there are no
externalities. The externalities increase the amount of resources needed to enforce the
law to a level at which it is no longer socially optimal. This result illustrates situations
that may happen in high crime neighborhoods; when the situation is considered to be
"hopeless," some laws are no longer enforced. The model explains how the positive
externality among criminals may be such that the law is too costly to be enforced.
Second, if ~c < c < h; the law is enforced both in the benchmark and when there
are externalities, although more enforcement resources are needed in the latter case.
Third, for the case where ~c > c and whenever c < h < ~c, it is optimal to enforce
the law only under the externalities. Finally, if ~c > c and c < ~c < h; the law is
enforced in both the benchmark and in the presence of the externalities, but now
more enforcement resources are needed in the former case.20
Corollary 9 The net e¤ect of the externalities on enforcement is determined in equi-
librium:
i) When opt = 1; in equilibrium the net e¤ect is negative (p < 0).
ii) When opt = 0; in equilibrium the net e¤ect is positive (p > 0).
Intuitively, whether the net e¤ect of the externalities is positive or negative in
equilibrium depends on the compliance rate resulting from the optimal enforcement
resources. If opt < ; then the equilibrium compliance is such that the net e¤ect of
the externality on the enforcement technology is positive. Alternatively, if opt > 
then in equilibrium the net e¤ect of the externality on enforcement is negative. Hence,
20This result is in contrast to the claim by Bar-Gill and Harel (2001) that when a higher crime
rate reduces the likelihood of the sanction, then the optimal investment in enforcement is always
lower in the benchmark than in the model that incorporates the crime rate as a determinant of the
expected sanction. They come to this conclusion because they fail to account for the fact that the
probability of sanction function is di¤erent when there is an externality than when no externality
exists. Essentially, the function has another argument that reects the intensity of the externality,
and they do not take account of this arguments independent inuence on the probability of sanction
function.
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in equilibrium, two communities that di¤er only in their values of  may end up with
di¤erent non-compliance rates. However, also note that there are ranges of  which
would generate the same e¤ect, so that empirical analysis will not nd a simple
monotonicity between a measurement of  and one of .
This result is particularly relevant since there exist policies that may a¤ect the
value of : Considering a technology with sensitivity to the externalities , the follow-
ing proposition summarizes what happens when the enforcement agency may inuence
the involvement of the community, :
Proposition 10 For any h > 0 there exists a large enough ~ < 1; above which
enforcing the law becomes optimal for the agency. As a consequence, laws that were
unenforced in the benchmark (because h < ~c); may be enforced in the presence of the
externalities. The critical value ~ might be decreasing or increasing in the sensitivity
of the enforcement technology to the externalities, .
Proof. See the Appendix
Given the value of harm generated by non-compliance, h, and a technology with
sensitivity to the externalities ; it may not be optimal for the agency to enforce
the law. However, the agency may reduce the necessary level of resources to enforce
the law, c; by increasing  to ~. In particular, the value of ~ provides an index to
measure the objective that community policing must accomplish.
The Neighborhood Watch Program created in 1972 is an example of the type of
policies that promote communication between neighbors and the police in the United
States. The purpose of this program is to reduce residential crime by involving citizens
and private organizations in law enforcement activities. As the Neighborhood Watch
Manual (elaborated by the United StatesNational Sheri¤sAssociation21) argues,
"the impact of law enforcement alone is minimal when compared with the power
21"Neighborhood Watch: A manual for citizens and for law enforcement" Available at
http://www.usaonwatch.org.
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of private citizens working with law enforcement." E¤orts on community policing
were encouraged through the US Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994 (the Crime Act). The results obtained in this section provide a rationale for
how these programs may have substantial e¤ects if they succeed in increasing the
communication between the police and the public.
In Europe, several countries have established community policing programs, for
instance the police de proximité in France or the Komunale Kriminalprävention in
Germany. However, as observed in Brogden and Nijhar (2005), "practice and un-
derstanding of the problem seem a long way" from the Anglo-American experience.
Nevertheless, rising recorded crime rates and riots by ethnic minorities in France have
prompted calls for a determined implementation of community policing.22
Endogenous neighborhood involvement in enforcement
If a larger number of o¤enders in a community leads to a lower neighborsinvolve-
ment in enforcement, then the involvement will depend on . For instance, this is the
case if violators can retaliate against those who provide information to the enforce-
ment authority or if witnesses are intimidated. In some urban (generally high crime)
communities of the United States, campaigns known as "Stop Snitchin" attempt to
deter collaboration between neighbors and the police. To model this kind of situation,
the involvement of a neighborhood must be endogenously determined.
Until now I have assumed that the involvement of a neighborhood in enforcement
is exogenous, and measured by the parameter : Consider now that the degree of
involvement is a monotonically decreasing function n of  such that n() 2 [0; 1) for
22"Life still grim in French suburbs despite pledges," Reuters, November 27th, 2007 and "La police
de proximité à nouveau au coeur des débats," Le Monde, November 27th, 2007.
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all :23 Then the probability of the sanction is given by:
P = p(c; ) = kc=(1 +   n()); (10)
where p < 0 since n0()  0:
Notice that introducing the function n does not alter any of the denitions. The
equilibrium condition for the individualsbehavior still implies that:
(c) =
8><>: 0 if p(c; 0)  b=f1 if p(c; 1) < b=f ; (11)
where now  is determined solely by c:
Using the denitions for minimal and maximal resources needed to reach P = b=f
then, under an endogenous involvement of the neighborhood, they are c = (b(1  
n(0))=fk)1= and c = (b(2   n(1))=fk)1=; respectively. Notice that c  ~c < c
still holds. Therefore, as with the exogenous neighborhood involvement, multiple
equilibria arise for enforcement resources in the interval c 2 [c; c), as shown in the
following proposition.24
Proposition 11 When the neighborhood involvement is endogenous, Proposition 2
still holds. Furthermore, the interval [c; c) is increasing in the spread between n(0)
23In contrast, Huck and Kosfeld (2007) consider a model where new membersrecruitment for a
neighborhood watch program is easier when there is a crime crisis.In such a framework, a higher
number of burglaries makes it more likely for neighbors to be enrolled in the neighborhood watch
program, which leads to a higher probability of catching a burglar. Their model di¤ers from mine
in several aspects; in particular, it evaluates the optimal magnitude of the sanction rather than the
optimal level of enforcement resources, and it does not allow for congestion. Nevertheless, I can
adjust my model to study a framework analogous to theirs. Assuming that neighborsinvolvement
is increasing in the crime rate (and excluding the congestion e¤ect) I would have that:
p(c; ) = kc=(1 + n())
where n() would be increasing in  rather than decreasing; hence, there would be a negative
externality among o¤enders. While this negative externality is certainly possible, it would predict
a negative correlation in criminal behavior (as in footnote (11)s case), which seems to be at odds
with the available evidence.
24Notice that c < c since 1  n(0) < 2  n(1). Also, notice that c  ~c < c still holds.
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and n(1); for n(0) or n(1) held xed.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Notice that n(0)  n(1) measures the change in the neighborsinvolvement when
the compliance rate switches from no compliance to full compliance. Thus, a larger
change in the neighborhood involvement leads to a larger range of enforcement re-
sources for which there are multiple equilibria.
The payo¤s for individual i are shown in Table 2. Following the same steps as
in Section 4.2, I nd the risk-dominant equilibrium for each level of enforcement
resources in the interval [c; c):
TABLE 2: Payoffs for individual i when the involvement is endogenous, ? = n(?)
Representative individual
PAYOFFS FOR
INDIVIDUAL i COMPLY NOT COMPLY
COMPLY 0 0
In
di
vi
du
al
 i
NOT
COMPLY c
a
))0(1( n
kfcb
-
- c
a
))1(2( n
kfcb
-
-
Proposition 12 For an endogenous neighborhood involvement described by the func-
tion n, there exists a level of enforcement, cendog , such that:
i) For any enforcement policy c < cendog the no-compliance equilibrium is risk domi-
nant.
ii) For any enforcement policy c > cendog the full-compliance equilibrium is risk dom-
inant.
iii) For an enforcement policy c = cendog; there is not a risk dominant equilibrium.
Furthermore, cendog is decreasing in n(1) and in n(0).
Proof. As shown in the Appendix, the proof is almost identical to the proof in
Proposition 3.
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As in Proposition 3, for each level of enforcement resources, risk dominance makes
one of the equilibria focal. However, the threshold level of resources cendog depends
now on n(1) and n(0):25 In particular, a lower level of neighborhoods involvement
under no compliance; n(1); results in a higher cendog needed to enforce the law. Like-
wise, a lower level of neighborhoods involvement under full-compliance; n(0); results
in a higher cendog:
Having a unique equilibrium per level of enforcement resources, I can solve the
problem of the enforcement agency as in Proposition 4. Specically, a small enough
n(1) may result in cendog > h; which implies that the optimal resources are zero.
Therefore, as the model illustrates, campaigns like "Stop Snitchin" can clearly cause
an increase in the resources needed for enforcement. Furthermore, enforcement
may become non-optimal because of a decrease in n(1). The Baltimore police have
launched the counter-campaign "Keep Talking" to prevent the negative consequences
of a deterioration in the communication between police and neighbors.26
Further discussion
Other possible neighborhood externalities
Until now I have assumed that becoming a criminal does not a¤ect the harm
perceived from others criminal activities. That is, becoming a criminal does not
make individuals less likely to be victims of crime. However, perhaps individuals can
avoid being victims of a crime by becoming criminals themselves.27 In this case, a
third externality arises because this additional benet from becoming a criminal is
increasing in the crime rate (since a higher crime rate is associated with a higher
degree of the harm). In this subsection I study the consequences of adding this
additional externality into the model.
25As with c; in order to ensure that p(cendog; )  1 for all ; then I impose b=f  12 + (1 n(0))

(2 n(1)) :
26"Police Counter Dealers DVD With One Of Their Own," New York Times, May 11th 2005.
27I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the analysis of this case.
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Let d() be the di¤erence between the degree of harm faced by compliers and the
degree of harm faced by violators given a non-compliance rate . Then, normalizing
to zero the payo¤ of complying with the law, the payo¤ from not complying is b +
d()   Pf , where d() > 0 represents the gain from avoiding part of the harm by
becoming a violator.28 In addition, I assume that d(0) = 0; that is, when the rest of
individuals are complying with the law, then becoming a criminal does not imply any
gain in terms of avoiding harm. Therefore the equilibria of the individuals is given
by:
(c) =
8><>: 0 if p(c; 0; )  (b+ d(0))=f1 if p(c; 1; ) < (b+ d(1))=f : (12)
Using the denition for minimal enforcement resources, then c = ((b(1   ) +
d(0))=kf)1= = (b(1  )=fk)1= That is, this additional externality does not a¤ect
c: In contrast, the maximal level of enforcement resources is now c = ((2   )(b +
d(1))=kf)1= which is greater than the initial (b(2 ))=kf)1=. Then, again multiple
equilibria arise for any level of enforcement resources c 2 [c; c): Furthermore, this
additional externality implies a larger range of enforcement resources for which there
are multiple equilibria.
The payo¤s for individual i are shown in Table 3. As in the previous sections
an equilibrium is reached when all of the individuals choose the same strategy. The
following proposition summarizes these results and studies the implications for the
risk-dominant equilibrium.
28Recall that when the harm from criminal activities a¤ects criminals and non-criminals the same,
as assumed in previous sections, such harm is irrelevant for the decision of whether to comply with
the law or not.
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TABLE 3: Payoffs for individual i when compliers perceive a higher degree of the harm
Representative individual
PAYOFFS FOR
INDIVIDUAL i COMPLY NOT COMPLY
COMPLY 0 0
In
di
vi
du
al
 i
NOT
COMPLY c
a
h)1( -
-
kfcb )1(
)2(
dkfcb +
-
- c
a
h
Proposition 13 When compliers perceive a higher degree of the harm than violators,
Propositions 2 and 3 hold. Furthermore, c and c are larger than when there are no
di¤erences in how individuals perceive the harm.
Therefore, this additional externality increases the cost of enforcement further.
Moreover, following Proposition 4, such an increase in c may imply that enforcing
the law in that neighborhood is no longer socially optimal. Finally, notice that this
same analysis serves to describe reputational benets from becoming a criminal that
are increasing in ; such as the ones modeled in Silverman (2004). The results here
complement those in Silverman (2004) since I am able to select among the multiple
equilibria.
Isolating the e¤ect of congestion
In this subsection I impose  = 0 to focus on the externality caused by congestion.
Notice that congestion at the neighborhood level is not the only form of congestion
that may arise in enforcement activities (e.g., there may be congestion in the adminis-
trative or court procedures that ensure punishment that depend on the technology
determined at the city or state level).
Since  = 0, P is given by:
P = p(c; ) = kc=(1 + ); (13)
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hence, p < 0 for all : The benchmarks results in Section 3 still hold for the case
with no externality,  = 0 . Figure 2 compares the equilibria for both the benchmark
and the case of congestion. Since congestion has a negative e¤ect on enforcement, all
the new equilibria under the externality for c 2 [c; c) are no-compliance equilibria.
m
1
ccc ~== cc = c
Individuals’
equilibria without the
externalities
Additional
individuals’ equilibria
under the externalities
Figure 2: Equilibria of the individuals under congestion
Using the equilibrium selection results, there is a c 2 (c; c) such that for any c > c;
the full compliance equilibrium is selected. The main di¤erence of this specic case
with respect to the general model is that now @c=@ > 0 (recall that for  > 0 the
sign of this partial derivative was ambiguous). As a consequence, the more sensitive is
the enforcement technology to congestion, the higher the amount of resources that are
needed to induce the full-compliance equilibrium. Thus, identical locations di¤ering
only in how sensitive their technology is to the externality, require di¤erent amounts
of resources to induce compliance since c is increasing in :
Moreover, a high enough  implies that the enforcement agency optimally chooses
not to enforce the law because c > h: Thus, if congestion exists and it is not ac-
counted for, the optimal policy will not be correctly specied. Also, and more impor-
tantly, if it is possible to decrease the sensitivity of the technology to this externality,
then the amount of resources needed for enforcement will be lower. Decreasing the
sensitivity of the technology to congestion is possible by decreasing the amount of en-
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forcement resources that are specically needed for activities related to punishment.29
For example, if punishment could take place instantaneously at the moment of detec-
tion, then resources would only be needed for detecting violators (e.g., there would
be no need for tow trucks), which reduces considerably the possibility of congestion.
Examples of policies aimed at reducing the resources needed specically for pun-
ishing activities are: incentives for voluntary payment of nes; demerit point systems
for tra¢ c violations;30 or allowing for plea bargaining in criminal cases. More re-
cently, the use of information and computer technology may become an e¤ective
way of reducing the need of resources for punishing activities. Electronic citation
programs and other forms of electronic processing technology programs are being
adopted throughout the United States (Department of Transportation (2003)). The
International Association of Chiefs of Police (2003) recommends the use of electronic
citations because the physical process of writing and issuing tra¢ c citations demands
a signicant amount of time and e¤ortfrom the patrol o¢ cer, the o¢ cespersonnel
and the court o¢ ce sta¤. In Europe, the European Commission launched in 2005
the project Fully Automatic Integrated Road Control to promote the use of this type
of technology. However, the adoption of these techniques into tra¢ c management is
proceeding slowly in most European countries.
Heterogeneous individuals
In this section, I assume that the benet from violating the law follows a uniform
distribution on the interval [0,1]. This extension allows me to examine how the e¤ects
of the externalities remain when the individuals are not homogenous. Since b follows
29Recall that, as explained in Section 2.3, in the enforcement process resources are used for activ-
ities related to detection, apprehension and punishment.
30Demerit point systems associated with tra¢ c regulation are becoming a popular policy. Pun-
ishment is more immediate than with traditional nes. Since the agency administers the number of
points of each driver, the punishment becomes e¤ective by simply reducing the number of points of
the violator.
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a uniform distribution, the non-compliance rate is given by:
(c) =
1Z
p(c;;)
db = 1  f  p(c; ; ) = 1  fkc

(1 +   ) : (14)
Let c(;; ) be the level of enforcement resources that induce a non-compliance rate
of  given a technology with a sensitivity to the externalities, ; and a neighborhood
with involvement, . Then:
c(;; ) =

(1  )(1 +   )
fk
1=
: (15)
If the technology is not sensitive to the externalities (i.e.,  = 0) then c(; 0; ) = ((1 
)=fk)1= which is a one-to-one function of : The externalities introduce distortions
in the level of enforcement resources needed to reach a specic non-compliance rate.
Also, multiple equilibria arise when c(;; ) is not a one-to-one function of : This
is because if c(;; ) is not monotone in ; the same level of enforcement resources
may induce more than one non-compliance rate.
Proposition 14 For  >  ( < ) enforcement is more (less) costly with the exter-
nalities (i.e.,  > 0) than without them (i.e.,  = 0). Furthermore, for  > 1   the
externalities lead to multiple equilibria.
Proof. See the Appendix
Figure 3 shows the equilibria of the individuals for the case where multiple equi-
libria arise (i.e., for  > 1 ): I denote as [C; C] the interval of enforcement resources
for which multiple equilibria arise: Since individuals di¤er now in their benet from
violating the law, b, denitions 3 and 4 do not apply here. Instead, C is the mini-
mal enforcement resources needed to reach  = 0 as an equilibrium. That is, C =
c(0;; ) which implies C = ((1   )=fk)1=: Then, for any level of enforcement
resources c > C;  = 0; is a possible equilibrium, although there may be others.
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Finally, C is the maximal level of enforcement resources for which a compliance rate
 > 0 is an equilibrium; in other words C is the maximum of c(;; ). Thus, for
c > C;  = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
?
c
CC
?
1
Individuals’ equilibria with
no externalities: c??;0,?)
Individuals’ equilibria under
the externalities: c(?; ? >0, ?)
Figure 3: Equilibria of the heterogeneous individuals
Conclusion
This paper studies externalities that a¤ect the productivity of enforcement re-
sources. The rst externality is due to congestion of enforcement resources, which
creates a positive externality among o¤enders by decreasing the probability of the
punishment. The second externality is determined by the communitys involvement
in enforcement activities. Neighborhoods with a higher degree of involvement lead to
a higher productivity of enforcement resources. When the involvement of the neigh-
borhood is decreasing in the number of o¤enders, an additional positive externality
among o¤enders arises.
These externalities explain the interdependence of individualsdecisions to break
the law, and generate neighborhood e¤ects. Multiple equilibria arise for a given level
of enforcement resources. Using risk dominance to select among the equilibria, I
show how the externalities a¤ect the optimal compliance rate and the optimal level
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of enforcement resources. When the net neighborhood e¤ect is negative and strong
enough, it may be too costly to enforce the law in that neighborhood.
While a signicant number of empirical studies have established the importance
of neighborhood e¤ects on crime, the issue has been largely neglected in theoretical
models on enforcement.31 This paper provides a theoretical framework that explains
how neighborhood e¤ects may be related to the productivity of the enforcement tech-
nology. In relation to particular residential policies, the model allows for a better
understanding of community policing and its consequences.
The results are extended to a framework where individuals are heterogeneous in
the benet from breaking the law which follows a uniform distribution. Alternative
distribution functions are left for further research; however, multiple equilibria and
similar conclusions are expected. Future progress in game theory is needed to nd
an equilibrium selection concept that can be applied to the framework with hetero-
geneous individuals.
Further research could also measure the impact of the externalities. However,
important methodological problems arise when trying to study neighborhood e¤ects
(such as selection bias or how to determine the boundaries of local communities).32
More importantly, di¤erences in the technologys sensitivity to congestion and in the
communitys involvement in enforcement activities are hard to observe and measure.
Nevertheless, this paper provides a rational explanation for the interdependence of
individualsdecisions to break the law, which is a stylized fact that has already been
documented.
31For a survey, see Sampson et al. (2002).
32Again, see Sampson et al. (2002).
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2:
i) For c < c and  > 0; then b   p(c; 1)f > 0 by denition of c: Thus, it is optimal
for each individual to break the law if all others do, and  = 1 is an equilibrium.
ii) For c  c and  > 0, then p(c; 0; ) = b=(f(1   ))  b=f by denition of c:
Thus, it is optimal for each individual to comply if all others do, and  = 0 is an
equilibrium.
Finally, c  c = (b=fk)1=((2  )=   (1  )=); which is increasing in .
Proof of Proposition 3:
As shown in Table 1, individual i and the representative individual play a 2 x 2
coordination game. Therefore, an equilibrium is reached when both players choose
the same strategy.
When being at the no-compliance equilibrium, let  be the probability that the
representative individual chooses the compliance equilibrium; then, individual i faces
a deviation loss of (b  fkc=(1  )): Since individual i obtains a payo¤ of zero in
case of deviating to comply, then she chooses not to comply as long as:


b  fkc

(1  )

+ (1  )

b  fkc

(2  )

 0:
That is, as long as:
  (b(2  )
   fkc)(1  )
fkc((2  )   (1  )) :
I denote as  the highest probability for which this condition holds (i.e., the highest
for which i chooses to not comply).
Similarly, when being at the full compliance equilibrium, I denote as  to the
probability that the representative individual deviates to not comply. Then individual
i chooses to comply only as long as the payo¤ from deviating is lower than the zero
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payo¤ from maintaining non-compliance. That is, as long as:
(1  )

b  fkc

(1  )

+ 

b  fkc

(2  )

 0:
Then:
  (fkc
   b(1  ))(2  )
fkc((2  )   (1  )) :
I denote as  the highest probability for which this condition holds. Then, for indi-
vidual i to comply risk dominates not to comply whenever  > : Meanwhile, not to
comply risk dominates to comply whenever  > : Meanwhile, none of the equilibria
risk dominates the other when  = : Let c be the threshold amount of enforcement
resources that satises this equality, then:
c =

2b(1  )(2  )
((2  ) + (1  ))fk
1=
:
Thus, for any c < c the risk-dominant strategy for player i is not to comply. Since
every player faces the same setup and the same payo¤ function, for any c < c
the equilibrium selected is the no-compliance equilibrium. Similarly, for c > c the
equilibrium selected is the full-compliance equilibrium.
Notice that for all  2 (0; 1] it is the case that c 2 (c; c): More precisely:
c = c 

2(2  )
(2  ) + (1  )
1=
;
where 2(2 )

(2 )+(1 ) > 1 for all  > 0: Also:
c = c 

2(1  )
(2  ) + (1  )
1=
;
where 2(1 )

(2 )+(1 ) < 1 for all  > 0. Also, notice that
@c
@
< 0:
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Finally, c is invariant to including the harm caused by non-compliance into the
individualspayo¤s. Notice that if non-compliance causes a harm vi(h) to individual
i; then the condition for i not to deviate from the non-compliance strategy is given
by:


b  fkc

(1  )

+ (1  )

b  fkc

(2  )   vi(h)

  (1  )vi(h);
which is equivalent to the condition imposed previously. It can be shown analogously
for :
Proof of Proposition 5:
From proposition 4 we know that it is optimal to enforce a law for any h > 0
if and only if h > c. Let ~ be the value such that h = c. The existence of
~ in the interval [0; 1) is ensured because as shown in the proof of Proposition 4,
c = c (2(2  )=((2  ) + (1  )))1= ; and thus:
lim
!1
c = 0 since lim
!1
c = 0:
Moreover, ~ is unique since @c=@ < 0: Therefore, for any  2 (~; 1) it holds that
h > c (i.e., it is optimal to enforce the law).
Finally, the sign of @~
@
can be obtained locally to  = ~() by applying the implicit
function theorem:
@~
@
=  @c
=@
@c=@~
;
where @c

@
> 0 as shown in the proof of proposition 4. Therefore, @~
@
< 0 if and only
if @c=@ > 0 which is only true for an interval of values of :
Proof of Proposition 6:
In the proof of Proposition 2, the results are shown for  2 [0; 1): Thus, introducing
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n() 2 [0; 1) instead of  does not a¤ect the results. In particular, for part i) notice
that for c < c (using the new value obtained for c) and  > 0, then b   p(c; 1)f >
0:Therefore, it is optimal for each individual to break the law if all others do; hence,
 = 1: Similarly in part ii), for c > c (using the new value obtained for c); then
b   p(c; 0)f < 0: Therefore, it is optimal for each individual to comply if all others
do; hence,  = 0 is an equilibrium.
Finally, c  c = (b=fk)1=((2  n(1))=   (1  n(0))=); which is increasing in 
as in the exogenous case. In addition, denoting the di¤erence n(0)  n(1) > 0 as D,
I can rewrite c   c = (b=fk)1=((2 + D   n(0))=   (1   n(0))=). Then, c   c is
increasing in D when holding n(0) xed. Similarly, if instead I substitute n(0) with
D + n(1), I nd that c  c is increasing in D when holding n(1) xed.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Using the payo¤s in Table 2, and using the same procedure as in Proposition
3, let endog be the probability that the representative individual deviates from the
non-compliance equilibrium by choosing to comply. Then individual i chooses not to
comply only as long as:
endog  (b(2  n(1))
   fkc)(1  n(0))
fkc((2  n(1))   (1  n(0))) :
Similarly, when being at the full compliance equilibrium, I denote as endog to the
probability that the representative individual deviates to not comply. Then individual
i chooses to comply only as long as:
endog 
(fkc   b(1  n(0)))(2  n(1))
fkc((2  n(1))   (1  n(0))) :
Therefore, following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 3, I nd a threshold
level of enforcement resources cendog such that for c < c

endog the full-compliance
equilibrium is risk dominant, and for c > cendog the no-compliance equilibrium is risk
44
dominant, where cendog is given by:
cendog =

2b(1  n(0))(2  n(1))
((2  n(1)) + (1  n(0)))fk
1=
:
Notice that
@cendog
@n(1)
< 0 and
@cendog
@n(0)
< 0: Also, as in Proposition 3, cendog 2 (c; c)
and , cendog is invariant to including the harm caused by non-compliance into the
individualspayo¤s.
Proof of Proposition 8:
This proof is as the proof of Proposition 3 except that now if both individual i
and the representative individual choose to not comply then the payo¤ of individual
i is

b  fkc
(2 ) + d(1)

rather than

b  fkc
(2 )

: Then individual i chooses not to
comply as long as:


b  fkc

(1  )

+ (1  )

b  fkc

(2  ) + d(1)

 0:
That is, as long as:
  (b(2  )
   fkc + d(1)  (2  ))(1  )
fkc((2  )   (1  )) + d(1)  (2  )(1  ) :
I denote as  the highest probability for which this condition holds:
Similarly, when being at the full compliance equilibrium, individual i chooses to
comply only as long as:
(1  )

b  fkc

(1  )

+ 

b  fkc

(2  ) + d(1)

 0:
Then:
  (fkc
   b(1  ))(2  )
fkc((2  )   (1  )) + d(1)  (2  )(1  ) :
I denote as  the highest probability for which this condition holds (i.e., the highest
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for which i chooses to comply). Then for individual i to comply risk dominates not
to comply whenever  > : Meanwhile, not to comply risk dominates to comply
whenever  > : Let c be the threshold amount of enforcement resources such that
 = , then:
c =

(2b+ d(1))(1  )(2  )
((2  ) + (1  ))fk
1=
>

(b(1  )(2  )
((2  ) + (1  ))fk
1=
:
Thus, under this third possible externality, the law enforcement agency has to choose
a higher level of enforcement resources than in Proposition 3 to induce compliance.
Proof of Proposition 9:
Comparing c(; > 0; ) and c(; 0; ), we see that if  >  a larger amount
of resources are needed because of the externalities since c(; > 0; ) > c(; 0; ):
Meanwhile, if  >  less resources because c(; > 0; ) > c(; 0; ):
Also, whenever  > 1   then c(; > 0; ) is not a one-to-one function. Notice
that c(;; ) is a one-to-one function only if @c(;; )=@ < 0 for all . However,
there are values of  and  for which this condition does not hold since:
@c(;; )
@
=
1


1
fk
1=
(1  )1=(1 +   )=


1 +     
1
1  

;
where all the elements are non-negative, except the last term in parenthesis that
might be positive or negative. In particular,
@c(;; )=@
8><>: > 0 if  < ( +   1)=(1 + )< 0 if  > ( +   1)=(1 + ) :
Thus, @c(;; )=@ < 0 for all  only if  < 1   : Whenever this condition holds,
each level of enforcement resources c induces a unique non-compliance rate, . How-
ever, for  > 1   then c(;; ) is not a one to one function.
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CHAPTER III
THE EFECT OF LAWYERSCAREER CONCERNS ON LITIGATION
Introduction
Legal disputes are frequent in a wide variety of economic activities.33 In particu-
lar, litigation expenses may increase the costs of healthcare, the costs of intellectual
property protection, and the prices of goods via products liability. Therefore, it is
worth examining the incentives behind lawyers decisions, particularly if those in-
centives may increase the costs of litigation. Since a lawyers performance in court
provides information about her skills, lawyers with career concerns might try to in-
uence this learning process. Specically, although winning a case might not imply a
large amount of direct earnings at the beginning of a lawyers career, it could have a
substantial impact on her future salary. Thus, the prospect of earnings growth upon
winning is an important incentive that might motivate lawyers to exert more e¤ort
in court.
Career concerns appear to be particularly relevant in the legal profession because
the variance of lawyers earnings is large (according to Rosen, 1992, the standard
deviation is more than 40 percent of the mean). Such large variance is not fully
explained by experience, gender, and working hours (again, see Rosen, 1992). In
fact, since di¤erences in (perceived) talents seem to explain part of the remaining
variance, the information about lawyersskills conveyed in trial outcomes might play
an important role in future earnings. Even though there is a large economics literature
on litigation, little is known about how lawyers reputational concerns may a¤ect
litigation e¤ort and the decision to settle.34
33More than 250,000 civil cases are led every year in Federal Courts in the United States. For
instance, in 2007 there were about 36,000 cases led related to personal injury product liability, and
more than 10,000 related to the protection of copyrights, patents and trademarks (Administrative
O¢ ce of the U.S. Courts, Statistical Tables for the Federal Judiciary, 2007).
34A short section in Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) discusses the robustness of their moral hazard
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In this paper I study how career concerns inuence e¤ort levels, settlement de-
cisions and the client-lawyer misalignment of interests. More importantly, because
there are substantial interactions in the decisions of the two parties in a legal dis-
pute, this paper pays special attention to how lawyersdecisions are a¤ected by the
career motives of their opponents. Also, I consider that the talent of the attorneys
is uncertain not only for the market but also for themselves and for other attorneys
(i.e., there is imperfect but symmetric information in the model), as usual in career
concerns models. Inexperienced attorneys, who are those who may have stronger
career concerns, are likely to have greater uncertainty about how they will perform
in court. Moreover, although they probably know the rank of the law school from
which they graduated, and the level of their performance there, this information is
also available to the market. Thus, there is little room for private information and
individual decisions will not involve any signaling behavior.
The model in this paper studies the e¤ect of career concerns on the e¤ort and
settlement decisions of two attorneys opposing each other in a case. To model the
career concerns of the attorneys, in addition to the explicit incentives (i.e., the award
in case of winning minus e¤ort costs), there will be a term in each attorneys payo¤
function that is increasing in the markets inference about her talent. The weight
that this term has in the attorneys payo¤ function will determine the strength of her
career concerns. The market does not observe the attorneys talent directly; thus, the
markets initial belief about the attorneys talent is given by the "prior" distribution
about attorneyscapabilities. However, if the case is taken to court, the outcome of
the trial provides additional information and will lead to an update of the markets
initial beliefs (this creates the "posterior" distribution).
The results show that attorneys with career concerns attempt to inuence the
model to the incorporation of career concerns. They argue that career concerns would not alter
signicantly their results. In contrast with their analysis, I consider a model where e¤ort decisions
are not binary, there may be asymmetries between the attorneys, and a settlement stage is studied.
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markets beliefs by exerting more e¤ort. Even though the market cannot be fooled
in equilibrium, attorneys with career concerns are trapped into providing higher ef-
fort levels than they would in the absence of reputational concerns.35 That is, two
attorneys with career concerns facing each other would be better o¤ by coordinating
on the no-career-concerns equilibrium e¤ort levels; however, they would have individ-
ual incentives to deviate. Also, when two attorneys have di¤erent degrees of career
concerns, then the attorney with stronger career concerns exerts more e¤ort in equi-
librium than her opponent. Consequently, she has a higher expected probability of
prevailing in court. Moreover, the attorney with weaker career concerns exerts more
e¤ort than in an equilibrium where both had the same career concerns. Therefore,
she is worse o¤ than if both had the same career concerns because she is trapped
into exerting more e¤ort, but has a lower probability of prevailing in court. Similar
results arise due to career concerns when the lawyers have di¤erent cost functions, or
when the uncertainty over their respective talents is di¤erent.
These results a¤ect the settlement stage because higher equilibrium e¤ort levels
imply larger trial costs and changes in the probability of prevailing in court. For
instance, I show that an increase in the plainti¤s attorneys career concerns (holding
the defendants attorneys career concerns xed) leads to a larger concession limit for
the defendant; that is, the defendants attorney is willing to settle at a larger set-
tlement amount. Similarly, an increase in the defendants attorneys career concerns
(holding the plainti¤s attorneys career concerns xed) leads to a smaller concession
limit for the plainti¤s attorney; that is, the plainti¤s attorney is willing to settle at
a lower settlement amount. In both cases, the overall e¤ect on the settlement range
is ambiguous because an increase in the career concerns of an attorney may increase
or decrease her own concession limit.
Within the settlement range, the amount resulting from the bargaining stage de-
35Section 1.2. discusses evidence of this equilibrium e¤ort trap.
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pends on the bargaining power of the parties. I study the e¤ect of career concerns for
di¤erent possible bargaining solutions. The results show that having stronger career
concerns is benecial for the party with more bargaining power. For instance, when
one of the attorneys has all the bargaining power, then she benets from an increase
in her career concerns. Intuitively, such an increase leads to higher equilibrium e¤ort
levels, and thus to a larger surplus from settlement, which is fully captured by the
party with all the bargaining power. When using Nash (1950)s bargaining solution,
I nd that an increase in the career concerns of the attorneys a¤ects the settlement
amount only when the attorneys have di¤erent career concerns. When increasing the
career concerns of only one of the attorneys, she obtains a better outcome from the
bargaining; in contrast, the attorney whose career concerns remain xed is worse o¤.
Similar results arise when modeling the settlement outcome using a random-proposer
bargaining game.
In addition, the paper analyzes the extent to which the equilibrium e¤ort levels
are a¤ected by the sensitivity of the trial outcome to the performance of the attor-
neys. I nd that the e¤ect of career concerns is increasing in the level of sensitivity.
The driving force is that the more sensitive is the outcome of the trial to the talent
of the attorneys, the more informative is winning or losing about the talent of the at-
torneys. I also study the implications of career concerns in the possible misalignment
of interests between the plainti¤ and her lawyer. The implicit incentives induced
by career concerns may ameliorate the insu¢ cient-investment distortion caused by
contingent-fee arrangements (for a detailed analysis of such distortion, see Polinsky
and Rubinfeld, 2003). However, this may not be the case if the opposing lawyer also
has strong career concerns.
Section 2 describes the basic model set-up. Section 3 derives the attorneysequi-
librium e¤ort levels when the attorneys are symmetric. Then I compare the results
with the equilibrium e¤ort levels when the career concerns, the cost functions, or the
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priors on the attorneystalents are di¤erent. Section 4 studies the implications of
Section 3s results for the decision to settle. Section 5 studies the e¤ect of changing
the sensitivity of the trial outcome to the performance of the attorneys. Section 6
examines the e¤ect of career concerns on the misalignment of interests between the
plainti¤ and her attorney. Finally, Section 7 concludes.
Related literature
The contract theory literature introduced career concerns to study agency problems
in one-agent models. As argued by Fama (1980), career concerns provide incentives for
the agent to exert higher e¤ort, to the point that it may solve a moral hazard problem.
However, as pointed out by Holmström (1982, 1999), the e¤ect of career concerns is
smaller the lower is the uncertainty about the ability of the agents. Dewatripont et
al. (1999a) extend the results to a more general framework with multiple tasks and
where e¤ort may a¤ect the agents future talent. In Dewatripont et al. (1999b), an
application of this multitask model explains the important role of career concerns for
government agencieso¢ cials.
There are some other relevant applications of the career concerns framework. The
literature in nance has done an extensive analysis of the e¤ect of career concerns
on investment decisions. In particular, career concerns may lead to ine¢ ciencies
(Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Milbourn et al., 2001; and Dasgupta and Prat, 2008) or
anomalies (Harbaugh, 2006). In general these models assume that agents have some
private (although noisy) information about their talent.
The analysis in this paper di¤ers from standard career concerns models because
it considers a model with two opposing agents. That is, a lawyers performance is
determined not only by her talent and her e¤ort level, but also by the performance
of the other lawyer. In particular, I assume that the performance of the attorneys in
court is determined by a contest success function. I use a "di¤erence-form" success
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function as in Che and Gale (2000), which implies that the probability of success is a
function of the di¤erence in the performance of the two lawyers. Examples of previous
contest modelsapplications to litigation are Katz (1988), Farmer and Pecorino (1999,
2000), Wärneryd (2000), Hirshleifer and Osborne (2001), and Baik and Kim (2007).
This paper is most closely related to Wärneryd (2000), and Baik and Kim (2007),
which study strategic e¤ects of delegating in lawyers the choice of e¤ort. Nevertheless,
none of these models accounts for career concerns.
In addition, the career concernsmodel in this paper incorporates other features
that are specic to litigation models. Legal disputes will not end up in court if parties
settle. Therefore, the model will consider a settlement bargaining process prior to
the trial stage, allowing me to study the impact of attorneys career concerns on
settlement decisions. Also, the outcome of the trial might be more or less sensitive
to the performance of the attorneys depending on the type of case, court, or legal
system. I study how the level of sensitivity a¤ects the results. Finally, a section
of the paper studies the e¤ect of career concerns when the plainti¤ and her lawyer
have misaligned interests. I study how career concerns a¤ect the misalignment that
arise when the lawyer is compensated through a contingency fee, which consists of a
percentage of the settlement or the award obtained by the plainti¤ in court.
Previous articles have studied the e¤ect of reputation in the legal profession. Fin-
gleton and Raith (2005) study bargaining outcomes when the parties hire reputation-
motivated agents to do the bargaining. Their analysis is based on the assumption
that talent is the private information of the agent. They nd that less talented
bargainers are more aggressive in open door bargaining (i.e., when their clients can
observe the bargaining process). As a consequence, open door bargaining has a higher
probability of ine¢ cient disagreements. Levy (2005) adapts the Scharfstein and Stein
(1990) herding model of investment to a judicial framework wherein monitoring only
takes place when litigants appeal. The author shows that judges with career concerns
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deviate from the e¢ cient decision by "excessively contradicting" previous judicial
decisions in order to signal ability.
A number of articles have analyzed the e¤ect of compensation systems for lawyers;
however, these models do not incorporate the e¤ect of lawyerscareer concerns. If
implicit incentives have important e¤ects on the decisions of lawyers, they will also
a¤ect the contracts between the lawyers and their clients. In a paper that studies
the contract choice of a risk averse agent with career concerns, Gibbons and Mur-
phy (1992) show that career concerns incentives play an important role even in the
presence of explicit performance-based incentives. Furthermore, since career concerns
e¤ects are stronger for younger workers, weaker explicit incentives are optimal in their
case, which is consistent with their empirical evidence studying CEO compensation.
As they argue, for young workers it can be optimal for current pay to be completely
independent of current performance.
As a rst step to study the e¤ect of career concerns on the attorney-client con-
tractual stage, I study the e¤ect of implicit incentives on lawyersdecisions when the
plainti¤ compensates her lawyer through a contingent fee (which consists of a per-
centage of the settlement or the award obtained by the plainti¤ in court). Previous
work has found three important results related to contingent fees. First, when the
plainti¤ does not observe the merits of her case and assuming that lawyers compete
for plainti¤scases following a model of monopolistic competition, Dana and Spier
(1993) show that compensation via contingent fees provides stronger incentives than
hourly fees for the attorney to reveal when a case has low expected returns. In ad-
dition, Rubinfeld and Scotchmer (1993) nd that, in a model with no restriction on
the type of contracts that attorneys and clients can make but where all cases are
assumed to go to trial, contingent fees serve as a screening device allowing clients to
separate between high and low quality attorneys. High talent attorneys are willing
to accept a lower contingent fee since they have a higher probability of prevailing in
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court. Finally, Polinsky and Rubinfeld (2003) show that contingent fees provide in-
su¢ cient incentives for the attorney to devote the e¤ort level desired by the plainti¤.
The authors propose an alternative compensation system in which, in addition to a
contingent fee, attorneys are partially compensated for their costs by a third party
and independently of the outcome from the trial. However, their model focuses on
the choice of e¤ort of the plainti¤s attorney; thus, strategic interactions with the
opposing lawyer are not considered. Also, the model does not account for career
concerns.
Related empirical ndings
The equilibrium e¤ort trap found in this paper is consistent with some empirical
ndings about lawyers. Landers et al. (1996) nd evidence that associate lawyers
overwork, in the sense that they prefer a decrease in hours of work to an increase
in their wage keeping the number of hours unchanged. Surveyed lawyers had to
decide between three hypothetical changes in their current income and work hours.
The results showed that almost two thirds of the associate lawyers in the sample were
interested in decreasing their hours of work. Specically, 65.1 percent chose a decrease
in their work hours keeping the same income while only 25.56 percent preferred to
keep their hours of work unchanged and have an increase of 5 percent in their income.
Finally, only 9.02 percent chose an increase of 5 percent in hours and 10 percent in
income. The authors argue that law rms induce lawyers to overwork as a screening
device. Their framework assumes that attorneys di¤er in their disutility of work, and
that they have private information about their types. In contrast, I study whether
career concerns induce lawyers to work more hours in a framework where there is no
signaling or screening involved.
Using condential survey data from the "After the JD Study," Ferrer (2009b) nds
that young lawyers involved in court cases work nearly ve hours per week more than
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other young practicing lawyers, once controlling for salary, educational background,
size of the law rm, and other variables. Table 1 below illustrates this result by
showing the unconditional average weekly work hours of the lawyers in this study.
Comparing the second and third rows, it can be seen that the average weekly work
hours is larger for young lawyers working in law rms that are involved in court cases
than for those who are not. In contrast, as shown in the second and third columns,
young lawyers involved in court cases are not expected to work or to bill more hours
than the others.
This is consistent with the equilibrium trap studied in this paper. Because the trial
outcome is a quite important source of information for the market, lawyers involved
in court cases attempt to inuence the markets beliefs by exerting more e¤ort and
winning the cases. In contrast, the measures to evaluate lawyers not directly involved
in court cases are likely to be more di¤use (e.g., the market does not have such a
clear measure of performance for lawyers involved in writing contracts or providing
legal advice) and there is less room for an equilibrium trap.
TABLE 4 – AVERAGE WEEKLY HOURS OF WORK (REPORTED)
Weekly hours
of work
Weekly hours
expected to work
Weekly hours
expected to bill
Inexperienced
lawyers 50.18 46.53 39.78
Inexperienced
lawyers working
in law firms not
involved in court
50.49 47.76 40.01
Inexperienced
lawyers working
in law firms, and
involved in court
cases
52.58 46.91 39.97
Survey data from 2002 of lawyers that passed the bar examination in 2000
Source: The “After the JD” study
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The model
The plainti¤s attorney (AP ) and the defendants attorney (AD) face the decision
of how much e¤ort to exert in a case at Court.
Attorney Ais talent is given by ti 2 f li; hi g where 0 <  li < hi  1 for i = P;
D. I assume that AP and AD observe neither their own true talent nor their rivals
talent. The market cannot observe the attorneystalents either. In other words, there
is imperfect but symmetric information in the model. Thus, there is a common prior
over the talent of an attorney; however, the common priors over the talents of P and
D may be di¤erent.36 That is, the unconditional probability of attorney i having
high talent is denoted by i > 0; which is common knowledge and where D may
be di¤erent from P . This is an unconditional probability in the sense that it does
not depend on the outcome of this specic dispute although it might depend on past
trial outcomes. I denote as i the a priori expected talent of attorney i. That is,
i = i
h
i + (1  i) li:
The outcome of the trial, denoted by z, is a function of the attorneys e¤orts,
denoted ei; i = P; D; and their talents:
z =
8><>: AP wins with probability (eP ; eD; tP ; tD)AP loses with probability 1  (eP ; eD; tP ; tD) :
After the trial takes place, the market estimates the talent of each attorney based on
the outcome of the trial; that is, the value of z. I assume that  takes the form:
(eP ; eD; tP ; tD) =
1 + eP tP   eDtD
2
: (16)
In order to ensure that  2 [0; 1]; I will make parametric assumptions su¢ cient to
36This assumption is standard in the career concerns literature (see for instance Holmström, 1982,
1999, and Dewatripont et al.,1999a). In the case of young attorneys, there seems to be little room
for private information about talent since it is not di¢ cult to have information about the academic
background of the attorneys and because attorneys have uncertainty about how talented they are
relative to their opponent.
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keep eP and eD 2 [0; 1] in equilibrium. This functional form belongs to the family
of "di¤erence-form" success functions that considers the probability of success as a
function of the di¤erence in the contestantsperformances.37
Given the functional form assumed for :
Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD)) =
1
2
+
P eP   DeD
2
; (17)
the expectation over  is taken with respect to both tP and tD; since there is common
imperfect information about both attorneystalents.
I assume that the attorneys performance is determined by talent and e¤ort which
are complements. Notice that the cross partial derivative of  (respectively, 1   )
with respect to eP and tP (respectively, eD and tD) is positive. Thus, if the attorneys
talent were known, more talented attorneys would exert more e¤ort than less talented
attorneys. As a consequence, a higher level of e¤ort increases how informative the
outcome of the trial is about each attorneys talent. This is the case because the
e¤ect of the talent on  is higher the more e¤ort is implemented.
Since the function is linearly separable with respect to eP and eD; in the absence
of career concerns the attorneys will have dominant strategies; that is, their optimal
levels of e¤ort will be independent of each other. Thus, the interactions that arise
between the attorneysdecisions are due to the e¤ect of career concerns.
The timing of the attorneysdecisions is:
Stage 1: Settlement stage; various bargaining solutions will be considered.
Stage 2: In case of trial the attorneys simultaneously decide how much e¤ort to exert
in Court.
In order to nd the optimal decision in the settlement stage, the attorneys anticipate
37Previous research using the "di¤erence-form" success function assumes linear costs of e¤ort
(Hirshleifer, 1989; Che and Gale, 2000) while I will assume quadratic e¤ort costs. Also, this form
of success function is not homogenous of degree zero, and thus it does not belong to the family of
functions studied in Skaperdas (1996).
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their optimal e¤ort levels if they were to face each other in Court. The optimal levels
of e¤ort are determined by the attorneys objective functions which are described
below.
APs objective function
I assume that the interests of the attorney and her client are aligned in the sense
that the attorney maximizes the combined payo¤ of P and AP. Section 6 studies the
case of misaligned interests. Let W be the award obtained by the plainti¤ in case of
winning the trial. Then, AP chooses the level of e¤ort in order to solve the following
problem:
max
eP2[0;1]
W  Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD)) 
cP e
2
P
2
+ P  fEt((eP ; eD; tP ; tD))  t^P (AP wins; eP ; eD)
+Et(1  (eP ; eD; tP ; tD))  t^P (AP loses; eP ; eD)g;
where cP is a cost parameter, eD isAPs and the markets conjecture aboutADs e¤ort
and eP is the markets conjecture about APs e¤ort. The rst two elements in the
objective function represent AP 0s explicit incentives: the expected award from Court
minus e¤ort costs. E¤ort costs are assumed to be quadratic because of decreasing
returns from e¤ort when nding evidence or legal arguments. In addition, e¤ort may
have an increasing cost in terms of the opportunity cost of having to decline other
cases or clients.
The terms t^P (AP wins; eP ; e

D) and t^P (AP loses; e

P ; e

D) are the key elements in
modeling the attorneys reputational concerns. They represent the markets inference
about APs talent conditioned on the outcome of the trial and on the markets con-
jecture about APs and ADs e¤orts. Attorneys with career concerns have payo¤s
that are increasing in the expected markets inference about their talent, which is
the expression in curly brackets. Finally, P measures the weight of this expected
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inference with respect to the attorneys explicit incentives; that is, it measures the
strength of AP 0s career concerns.
The rst-order condition38 for the interior solution can be written as:
WP
2
  cP eP + PP
2
(t^P (AP wins; e

P ; e

D)  t^P (AP loses; eP ; eD)) = 0: (18)
As shown in the Appendix, the di¤erence between the markets inference about tP in
case of AP winning and in case of AP losing can be written as follows:
t^P (AP wins; e

P ; e

D)  t^P (AP loses; eP ; eD) =
2eP
2
P
1  (P eP   DeD)2
;
where 2P is the variance of the prior onAPs talent. Finally, notice that in equilibrium
the level of e¤ort chosen by AP has to coincide with the markets conjecture of her
e¤ort, eP :
ADs objective function
Similarly as for AP , assuming no agency problem between the defendant and her
attorney, then AD chooses the level of e¤ort in order to solve the following problem
(reecting the combined payo¤ of D and AD):
max
eD2[0;1]
 W  Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD)) 
cDe
2
D
2
+ D  fEt((eP ; eD; tP ; tD))  t^D(AP wins; eP ; eD)
+Et(1  (eP ; eD; tP ; tD))  t^D(AP loses; eP ; eD)g;
where eP is ADs and the markets conjecture about APs e¤ort, and e

D is the
markets conjecture of ADs e¤ort. The rst two elements in the objective function
represent AP 0s explicit incentives: the expected award from Court minus e¤ort costs.
As in APs case, e¤ort costs are assumed to be quadratic because of decreasing returns
38Note that the objective function is strictly concave in eP . Therefore, if the optimal eP 2 (0; 1),
then it must satisfy equation (3).
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from e¤ort when nding evidence or legal arguments.
The key elements in modelingAD0s reputational concerns are t^D(AP loses; eP ; e

D)
and t^D(AP wins; eP ; e

D); which represent the markets inference about ADs talent
conditioned on the outcome of the trial and on the markets conjectures about APs
and ADs e¤orts. Therefore, the expression in curly brackets represents the expected
markets inference about AD0s talent. Finally, D measures the strength of AD
0s
career concerns.
Substituting Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD)) in ADs maximization problem, the rst-order
condition for the interior solution can be written as:
WD
2
  cDeD + DD
2
(t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D)  t^D(AP wins; eP ; eD)) = 0: (19)
As in the case of AP , it is shown in the Appendix that the di¤erence between the
markets inference about tD in case of AD winning and in case of AD losing can be
written as follows:
t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D)  t^D(AP wins; eP ; eD) =
2eD
2
D
1  (ePP   eDD)2
:
where 2D is the prior variance on ADs talent. Finally, notice that in equilibrium
the level of e¤ort chosen by AD has to coincide with the markets conjecture of her
e¤ort, eD:
The choice of e¤ort in Court
In this section, rst I nd the equilibrium e¤ort levels when the two attorneys are
symmetric. Then I use the results of the symmetric case as a benchmark to study
the e¤ects of career concerns when the attorneys di¤er in the strength of their career
concerns, in their cost functions, and in the prior on their talent.
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The equilibrium level of e¤ort in the symmetric case
When the attorneys are symmetric, then P = D = , 
2
P = 
2
D = 
2, P = D =
 and cP = cD = c: A rst important implication is that:
Et((eP ; e

D; tP ; tD)) =
1
2
+
(eP   eD)
2
; (20)
that is, whoever exerts more e¤ort in court has a higher expected probability of
winning the case. Notice that this is the case only for the expected probability of
winning the case; the actual trial outcome depends on the realizations of the attorneys
talents.
According to the rst-order condition in equation (3), APs equilibrium e¤ort
level, eP ; must satisfy:
eP

c  
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

=
W
2
: (21)
In order to ensure that in equilibrium eP 2 (0; 1); I assume that c > W=2 +
2=(1   2(1   eD)2) for all possible eD 2 [0; 1]: To ensure that this condition
holds it is enough to assume that c > W=2 + 2=(1  2): Under this parametric
assumption APs optimal level of e¤ort is always an interior solution since it ensures
that eP < 1. Notice that e

P = 0 is never an optimal level of e¤ort for AP .
According to the rst order condition in equation (4), ADs rst-order condition
for the interior solution is actually symmetric to APs since it can be written as:
eD

c  
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

=
W
2
: (22)
Since ADs maximization problem is symmetric to APs, the parametric assump-
tion taken for c also ensures that eD 2 (0; 1): Therefore, that assumption ensures that
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 2 [0; 1] in equilibrium. Simplifying these two equations:

c  
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

=
W
2eP
=
W
2eD
: (23)
Therefore it must be that eP = e

D:
Proposition 15 The symmetric equilibrium is the only solution to the e¤ort opti-
mization problem of the attorneys. Therefore, the optimal levels of e¤ort are:
e = eP = e

D =
W=2
c  2 : (24)
The equilibrium e¤ort levels are increasing in the Court award, W , and in the a
priori expected talent of the attorneys, . Also, the attorneys exert more e¤ort the
higher is the variance of the prior on their talent, holding the mean, , constant. In
other words, the greater is the uncertainty about their talent, the more incentives
they have to exert a higher level of e¤ort. Since the variance of the prior may be
expressed as (1   )(h    l)2; a mean preserving spread of the attorneys types
leads to an increase in the e¤ort levels. However, the e¤ect of  on the equilibrium
e¤ort level is ambiguous. Finally, the equilibrium e¤ort levels are decreasing in the
cost parameter, c. Notice that the parametric assumption made above to ensure
interior solutions implies that c   2 is always strictly positive. Table 2 below
summarizes the e¤ect of increases in the parameters on e.
Table 5 - Comparative statics regarding increases in the parameters
W  2 (h    l)2   c
E¤ect on the equilibrium e¤ort e " " " " ? " #
Let  = (eP ; e

D; tP ; tD) be the realized probability that AP succeeds at trial.
Since the equilibrium e¤ort levels are equal and the talents of the attorneys are not
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known, the expected probability thatAP wins the trial isEtfg = 1=2: Furthermore,
since the equilibrium e¤orts coincide, if one attorney has higher talent than the other,
then the realized probability of prevailing in Court is also higher. If the talents of
AP and AD are the same then  is also 1=2.
The market anticipates how much e¤ort to expect from the attorneys; hence, the
attorneys e¤ort decisions cannot mislead the markets inference (i.e., Etfg  t^P (AP
wins; eP ; e

D) + Etf1   g  t^P (AP loses; eP ; eD) = ). However, the attorneys are
trapped into providing higher e¤ort than in the case without career concerns. Notice
that if  is zero for both attorneys, then the e¤ort implemented in equilibrium would
be W
2c
; which is lower than e.
Therefore, as argued in a one-agent model by Fama (1980), career concerns provide
incentives for agents to exert higher e¤ort. As a consequence, explicit incentives may
not need to be as strong in the presence of career concerns. However, as pointed
out by Holmström (1982), the e¤ect of career concerns is smaller the lower is the
uncertainty about the ability of the agents. In this model, as the variance of the
prior on the attorneystalent decreases, so does the equilibrium e¤ort. Therefore,
reputational incentives are stronger the less precise is the markets initial information
about the attorneystalents.
Asymmetric career concerns
Assume now that AP and AD have career concerns measured by P and D;
respectively, where P > D. Then the equilibrium levels of e¤ort, e

P and e

D; must
satisfy:
eP

c  P
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

=
W
2
; (25)
eD

c  D
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

=
W
2
: (26)
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Therefore, since P > D it must be that e

P > e

D in any possible equilibrium
39, since
the expression in parentheses is smaller in the rst equation. Similarly, for P < D
it must be that eP < e

D in equilibrium. Put di¤erently, the attorney with higher
career concerns exerts more e¤ort in equilibrium.
Furthermore, it can be shown that a change in  for one of the attorneys a¤ects
the level of e¤ort of the other attorney even when her own  remains unchanged. To
see this, let the initial attorneysequilibrium e¤ort levels be e as in equation (9),
where career concerns are P = D = . Now suppose that P increases while D
remains equal to , let eP and e

D denote the new equilibrium e¤ort levels in this
case. As was shown at the beginning of this subsection, whenever P > D then the
equilibrium e¤ort level of AP is greater than the equilibrium e¤ort level of AD (i.e.,
eP > e

D). In order to compare these new equilibrium e¤ort levels with the initial
equilibrium, notice that eD and e
must satisfy equation (11) and (9), respectively.
Thus:
eD

c  D
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

= e
 
c  2 ;
where since D = , it must be that e

D > e
 since (given the domains dened for
e¤ort and talent) 1   2(eD   eP )2 2 (0; 1]. Therefore, an increase in APs career
concerns induces AD to increase her equilibrium e¤ort level.
In addition, notice that eP and e
 must satisfy equations (10) and (9), respectively.
Thus:
eP

c  P
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

= e
 
c  2 ;
where eP > e
 since P >  implies that the expression in parentheses in the left-hand
side of the equation is larger than the one in the right-hand side. Therefore, when
APs career concerns increase, APs new equilibrium e¤ort level is higher than her
initial equilibrium e¤ort level and higher than ADs new equilibrium e¤ort level.
39It may be that more than one pair (eP ; e

D) satises the conditions above.
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An analogous result holds for an increase in D when P remains xed. The
following proposition and Figure 1 summarize these results.
Proposition 16 Starting from P = D = ; an increase in i (holding j xed)
implies that both attorneys increase their e¤ort but Ai increases more than Aj.
eP
eD
e*
e*
? = ?D < ?P
? = ?P < ?D
eP = eD
Figure 4: Equilibrium e¤ort levels when increasing i while holding j xed
Asymmetric costs
Assume now that the attorneys costs functions di¤er such that cP < cD. The
equilibrium e¤ort levels, eP and e

D, must satisfy:
eP

cP   
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

=
W
2
; (27)
eD

cD   
2
1  2(eP   eP )2

=
W
2
: (28)
Therefore, in any possible equilibrium40 it must be that eP > e

D. Because e¤ort is
less costly for AP , she exerts more e¤ort than AD in equilibrium. Similarly, for cP
40It may be that more than one pair (eP ; e

D) satises the conditions above.
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> cD it must be that eP < e

D in equilibrium. Thus, the attorney with higher costs
exerts less e¤ort in equilibrium.
Most importantly, following the same procedure as with asymmetric career con-
cerns, it can be shown that when  > 0 a change in costs for one of the attorneys
a¤ects the level of e¤ort of the other attorney even when her own costs remain un-
changed. Notice that when the attorneys have no career concerns (i.e.,  = 0), there
are no interactions between the attorneys choices of e¤ort. More specically, AP
would exert a level of e¤ort W=2cP that is independent of the cost function of her
opponent, while AD would choose a level of e¤ort W=2cD:
In contrast, when  > 0 there are interactions between eP and e

D: To see this,
let the initial attorneysequilibrium e¤ort levels be e as in equation (9), where the
attorneyscost parameters are cP = cD = c: Now suppose that cP decreases while
cD remains equal to c, let eP and e

D denote the new equilibrium e¤ort levels in this
case. As shown above, because cP < cD then the equilibrium e¤ort level of AP is
greater than the equilibrium e¤ort level of AD (i.e., eP > e

D). Hence, it is possible
to compare these new equilibrium e¤ort levels with the initial equilibrium. First, eD
and e must satisfy equations (13) and (9), respectively. Thus:
eD

c  
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

= e
 
c  2 ; (29)
where it must be that eD > e
 since (given the domains dened for e¤ort and talent)
1  2(eD   eP )2 2 (0; 1]. That is, when APs cost of e¤ort decreases (holding ADs
costs xed), ADs equilibrium e¤ort level increases.
Second, notice that eP and e
 must satisfy equations (12) and (9), respectively,
which implies that:
eP

cP   
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

= e
 
c  2 ; (30)
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where eP > e
 since cP < c implies that the expression in parentheses in the left-hand
side of the equation is smaller than the one in the right-hand side. Therefore, when
APs cost of e¤ort decreases, APs new equilibrium e¤ort level is higher than her
initial equilibrium e¤ort level and higher than ADs new equilibrium e¤ort level.
An analogous result holds for an increase in cD when cP remains xed: The fol-
lowing proposition and Figure 2 summarize these results.
Proposition 17 Starting from cP = cD = c; a decrease in ci (holding cj xed) implies
that, for  > 0; both attorneys increase their e¤ort, but Ai increases more than Aj.
eP
eD
e*
e*
cP < cD = c
cD  < cP = c
eP = eD
Figure 5: Equilibrium e¤ort levels when decreasing ci holding cj xed
Asymmetric priors
The priors on the attorneystalents may be di¤erent due, for instance, to di¤er-
ences in the rank of the law school from which they graduated, or in past performance
in Court. An important di¤erence with respect to the symmetric case is that exerting
more e¤ort in court does not necessarily imply a higher expected probability of win-
ning. In particular, for attorney i to have a higher expected probability of prevailing
in court than attorney j; her e¤ort level must be such that ei > ejj=i:
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According to the rst-order condition in equation (3), APs equilibrium e¤ort
level, eP ; must satisfy:
WP
2
= eP

c  P
2
P
1  (P eP   DeD)2

: (31)
In order to ensure that in equilibrium eP 2 (0; 1); I assume that c > WP=2 +
P
2
P=(1  (P   DeD)2) for all possible eD 2 [0; 1]: To ensure that this condition
holds it is enough to assume that c is large enough.41 Notice that, as in the case of
symmetric priors, eP = 0 is never an optimal level of e¤ort for AP .
Similarly, ADs rst-order condition for an interior solution is given by:
WD
2
= eD

c  D
2
D
1  (ePP   eDD)2

: (32)
As in the case of AP, in order to ensure that in equilibrium eD 2 (0; 1); I assume that
c > WD=2 + D
2
D=(1  (P eP   D)2) for all possible eD 2 [0; 1]: To ensure that
this condition holds it is enough to assume that c is larger enough.42 Notice that, as
in the case of symmetric priors, eD = 0 is never an optimal level of e¤ort for AD.
In equilibrium, APs and ADs levels of e¤ort must satisfy equations (16) and
(17). Thus, they must satisfy:
eP
P

c  P
2
P
1  (P eP   DeD)2

=
eD
D

c  D
2
D
1  (ePP   eDD)2

:
To compare the equilibrium e¤ort levels when the priors are asymmetric, I focus
on one possible interesting case of asymmetric priors: attorneys having the same prior
41Specically, c WP =2 > Max fP2P =(1  2P ); P2P =1  (P   D)2g: Under this para-
metric assumption, APs optimal level of e¤ort is always an interior solution since the assumption
ensures that eP < 1.
42Specically, c WD=2 > Max fD2D=(1  2D); D2D=1  (P   D)2g: Under this para-
metric assumption, ADs optimal level of e¤ort is always an interior solution since the assumption
ensures that eD < 1.
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expected talent but di¤erent prior variance. This case arises if, for instance, there is
more uncertainty over the talent of one of the lawyers because of shorter experience.
As discussed previously, higher expected talent is associated with higher e¤ort levels
because of the complementarities between e¤ort and talent. In order to focus only on
the e¤ects of di¤erences in the prior variance, Proposition 4 and Figure 3 compare
the equilibrium e¤ort levels when assuming the same prior expected talent.
Proposition 18 Let  li; 
h
i ; 
l
j; 
h
j ; i and j for i; j 2 fP;Dg be such that i = j
and j < i: Then:
i) In equilibrium, the attorney with a higher prior variance exerts more e¤ort in Court
(i.e., ej < e

i ):
ii) Starting at i = j =  and 
2
i = 
2
j = ; an increase in 
2
i (holding 
2
j xed)
implies that both attorneys increase their e¤ort but Ai increases more than Aj.
Proof. See the Appendix
eP
eD
e*
e*
? = ?D < ?P
eP = eD
? = ?P < ?D
Figure 6: Equilibrium e¤ort levels when increasing i while holding  and j xed
Intuitively, winning a case has a larger positive e¤ect for the attorney with a higher
prior variance because the market has greater uncertainty over her talent. Similarly,
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losing a case has a larger negative e¤ect. Thus, her incentives to exert more e¤ort in
Court are stronger.
Settlement
Considering the equilibrium e¤ort levels in case of trial, it is possible to study
the e¤ects of career concerns on the settlement process. As usual in settlement bar-
gaining models, the concession limits are increasing in the court costs. In this model
the court costs depend on the equilibrium choice of e¤ort, and thus are determined
endogenously in the litigation stage. Thus, the settlement range depends on the
attorneysanticipated equilibrium choices of e¤ort.
In this section I focus on the case in which settlement is not informative about the
talent of the attorneys and thus has no e¤ect on the priors of the litigation stage. For
instance, this is the case when the kind of talent relevant for bargaining is di¤erent
(and somehow uncorrelated) from the kind of talent relevant in the trial stage. Also,
trials appear to be more informative about talent than settlement process because
trials are usually complex procedures that test the attorneysskills to a greater extent,
and because many settlement agreements are sealed, in contrast with court judgments
that are publicly available in general.
In other cases, settlement provides information about the attorneys litigation
talent. In particular, reaching a good settlement agreement might reveal that the
attorney is talented. If the settlement agreement is sealed then the attorney would
acquire private information about her talent and there would be asymmetric infor-
mation in the litigation stage. Also, depending on whether a settlement agreement
is reached or not, the market might also update its information about the attorneys
talents. Alternatively, if the agreement is publicly available, then the settlement out-
come would be informative about the attorneystalents and would a¤ect the priors
on the attorneystalents. As a consequence, career concerns may a¤ect the attorneys
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strategies in a similar way as in the litigation stage studied above. These cases are
left for further research.
Settlement in the symmetric case
When the career concerns, the cost functions, and the priors of AP and AD are
identical, the attorneys equilibrium e¤ort levels in case of trial coincide. I continue to
assume that the interests of the client and the attorney are aligned; thus, the choice of
whether to settle or not is made by considering the combined payo¤ of each attorney
and her client. Section 6 discusses a possible attorney-client misalignment of interests
in the settlement stage.
Denote the markets inference of attorney is talent in case of settlement as
t^i(settle; e

P ; e

D); i = P;D: Since settlement does not provide any additional informa-
tion over the talent of the attorneys, t^i(settle; eP ; e

D) is the a priori expected talent,
: Notice that since attorneys have the same uncertainty over their talents as the
market does, settlement decisions do not signal any information about the attorneys
talents either.
Therefore, AP settles as long as the payo¤ from settlement, S, is at least as large
as the ex ante expected combined payo¤ from going to trial. That is, if it satises:
S +   t^P (settle; eP ; eD) 
W
2
  ce
2
2
+ Et;zft^P (z; eP ; eD)g;
which is equivalent to:
S +   W
2
  ce
2
2
+ :
Thus, career concerns a¤ect the settlement constraint only through their e¤ect on the
e¤ort choice.
Similarly, AD settles as long as the settlement amount, S, is at most what she
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expects to lose from going to trial. That is:
S +   t^D(settle; eP ; eD) 
W
2
+
ce
2
2
  Et;zft^P (z; eP ; eD);
which is equivalent to:
S +   W
2
+
ce
2
2
  :
Therefore, the settlement range is given by:
S 2
"
W
2
  ce
2
2
;
W
2
+
ce
2
2
#
:
Since e is increasing in ; stronger career concerns of the attorneys lead to larger
trial costs. As a consequence, stronger career concerns result in a larger scope for
settlement. In other words, because career concerns provide incentives to be more
aggressive at the trial stage, the gains from settlement, ce
2
, are increasing in the
strength of the attorneyscareer concerns. Thus, career concerns (as modeled here)
do not make the attorneys uniformly (i.e., in all the stages of the legal dispute) more
aggressive.
Settlement with asymmetric career concerns
Suppose as in Section 3.4 that P 6= D: Then in case of trial, the attorneys
equilibrium levels of e¤ort di¤er from each other; that is, eP 6= eD: Consequently, the
attorneys no longer have the same expected probability of prevailing in Court and
the costs of going to trial also di¤er.
As in the symmetric case, the markets inference after settlement is also the a
priori expected talent, : Thus, career concerns a¤ect settlement decisions again
only through their e¤ect on the e¤ort choice.
AP settles as long as the payo¤ from settlement, S, is at least as large as the
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expected combined payo¤ from going to trial. That is:
S  APs concession limit  W  Etfg   c(e

P )
2
2
: (33)
Similarly, AD settles as long as the settlement amount, S, is at most what she expects
to lose from going to trial:
S  ADs concession limit  W  Etfg+ c(e

D)
2
2
: (34)
Therefore, the settlement range is now given by:
S 2

W
2
(1 + (eP   eD)) 
c(eP )
2
2
;
W
2
(1 + (eP   eD)) +
c(eD)
2
2

: (35)
An increase in the career concerns of one of the attorneys a¤ects the settlement
range because the equilibrium levels of e¤ort change, and hence so do the trial costs.
For instance, recall from Section 3.4 that if APs career concerns increase such that
P > D = ; then e

P > e

D > e
: As a consequence, ADs concession limit increases
not only because her expected probability of prevailing in Court decreases but also
because her anticipated trials costs are larger. Notice that this is true even though
ADs career concerns remain xed, as shown in Proposition 2.
More generally, if an attorney Ai0s career concerns increase (holding j xed)
such that i > j; then Aj
0s equilibrium level of e¤ort increases but her expected
probability of prevailing in Court decreases. Consequently, an increase in Ai0s career
concerns a¤ects Aj0s concession limit. On the other hand, Ais expected probability
of prevailing in Court is larger than in the symmetric case because now ei > e

j ;
as shown in Proposition 2. However, is trial costs also increase when i increases.
Therefore, the e¤ect on Ais concession limit is ambiguous. The following proposition
summarizes these results.
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Proposition 19 Starting from P = D = :
i) An increase in P (holding D xed) implies that ADs concession limit increases,
while the e¤ect on APs concession limit is ambiguous.
ii) An increase in D (holding P xed) implies that APs concession limit decreases,
while the e¤ect on ADs concession limit is ambiguous.
Settlement with asymmetric costs
Suppose as in Section 3.5 that cP 6= cD: Then in case of trial, the attorneysequi-
librium levels of e¤ort di¤er from each other; that is, eP 6= eD: Hence, the attorneys
no longer have the same expected probability of prevailing in Court.
Since the cost parameters are common knowledge, the markets inference after
settlement is also the a priori expected talent, : Therefore, changes in the settlement
decisions arise due only to the changes created in the e¤ort levels. Also, the attorneys
ex ante expectation of the markets inference about their talent is the average talent,
; both in case of settlement and in case of trial:
The attorneysconcession limits and settlement range are again given by expres-
sions (18), (19) and (20). Using the results in Proposition 3, if an attorney Ai0s cost
parameter ci decreases (holding cj xed) such that ci < cj; then Ajs equilibrium
e¤ort level increases but her expected probability of prevailing in Court decreases.
Consequently, an increase in Ai0s career concerns a¤ects Aj0s concession limit: With
respect to Ai; her expected probability of prevailing in Court is larger than in the
symmetric because now ei > e

j : However, is trial costs also increase since e

i increases
when ci decreases. Therefore, the e¤ect on Ais concession limit is ambiguous. The
following proposition summarizes these ndings.
Proposition 20 Starting from cP = cD = c:
i) A decrease in cP (holding cD xed) implies that ADs concession limit increases,
while the e¤ect on APs concession limit is ambiguous.
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ii) A decrease in cD (holding cP xed) implies that APs concession limit decreases,
while the e¤ect on ADs concession limit is ambiguous.
Settlement with asymmetric priors
When the priors on the attorneystalents di¤er, the equilibrium e¤ort levels, and
therefore the settlement stage, are a¤ected. Given the attorneysconcessions limits
and settlement range in expressions (18), (19) and (20), Proposition 4 implies that an
increase in the prior variance of one of the attorneys increases the scope of settlement.
More specically, when the priors are such that P = D and P > D, AP exerts
more e¤ort in equilibrium (i.e., eP > e

D); and has a higher expected probability of
prevailing in court than AD. Also, Proposition 4 shows that ADs e¤ort level is larger
than in the symmetric case. Thus, ADs concession limit increases because when
facing an attorney with a larger P , her probability of prevailing in Court decreases
and her anticipated trial costs increase. On the other hand, the e¤ect on AP 0s
equilibrium level of e¤ort is ambiguous since her expected probability of prevailing in
Court is larger than in the symmetric, because now eP > e

D; as shown in Proposition
4, but her trial costs also increase. The analogous result can be shown for an increase
in D. The following proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 21 Starting from P = D = :
i) An increase in P (holding D; P and D xed) implies that ADs concession
limit increases, while the e¤ect on APs concession limit is ambiguous.
ii) An increase in D (holding P ; P and D xed) implies that APs concession
limit decreases, while the e¤ect on ADs concession limit is ambiguous.
The outcome of bargaining
Since there is symmetric information in the model, the parties always settle. That
is, the parties never reach the trial stage because they agree on a settlement amount.
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Within the settlement range, the settlement amount resulting from the bargaining
stage depends on the bargaining power of the parties. Table 3 shows settlement
outcomes using four possible bargaining solutions for both the case of symmetric and
asymmetric career concerns.
In the rst bargaining solution considered, AD has all the bargaining power. The
outcome corresponds to a sequential game in which AD makes a-take-or-leave-it-
o¤er.43 If AP rejects the o¤er the parties go to trial. Thus, AD o¤ers a settlement
amount S equal to APs concession limit, and AP accepts it.44 Analogously, in the
second bargaining solution considered AP has all the bargaining power. Thus, AP
o¤ers a settlement amount equal to ADs concession limit, and AD accepts it.
In both of these cases, as shown in Table 3, an increase in the career concerns of
the attorneys benets the party that has all the bargaining power. Intuitively, such
an increase leads to higher equilibrium e¤ort levels, and thus to a larger surplus from
settlement, which is fully captured by the party with all the bargaining power. By the
same reasoning, the attorney with all the bargaining power benets from an increase
a¤ecting only her career concerns. Specically, when AD has all the bargaining power
then D > P (assuming that the attorneys have the same costs and average talent)
implies that S < W=2  ce2=2; which is the bargaining outcome when the attorneys
have the same career concerns and AD has all the bargaining power. Similarly, when
AP has all the bargaining power, then P > D (assuming that the attorneys have
the same costs and average talent) implies that S > W=2 + ce2=2; which is the
bargaining outcome when both attorneys have the same career concerns and AP
has all the bargaining power. Therefore, asymmetric career concerns reinforce the
43This case is particularly relevant since, as shown by Schwartz and Wickelgren (2009), its outcome
coincides with the outcome of an alternating-o¤er bargaining game with an indenite number of
possible o¤ers and counter-o¤ers. Intuitively, in such a game, the defendant has no interest in
terminating the bargaining and she can always deter the plainti¤ from doing so by making an o¤er
equal to the plainti¤s outside option.
44AP is indi¤erent between accepting the o¤er and going to trial. I assume that AP accepts since
otherwise AD could induce APs acceptance by increasing the o¤er slightly.
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bargaining advantage in these cases.
TABLE 6: Outcome of the Settlement Bargaining Stage
Symmetric case Asymmetric case
Bargaining
solution S*
Effect
of b­ S*
AD has all
bargaining power 2
*
2
2ceW
- ¯*S
2
**)*1(
2
2
PP
DDPP
eceeW --+ mm
AP has all
bargaining power 2
*
2
2ceW
+ ­*S
2
**)*1(
2
2
DD
DDPP
eceeW +-+ mm
Nash Bargaining
Solution 2
W
No effect )**(4
1*)*1(
2
22
DDPPDDPP ececee
W
---+ mm
Random proposer
with ? prob. that
AP proposes
)2/1(*
2
2 -+ gceW
­*S if ? > 1/2
¯*S if ? < 1/2
--+ *)*1(
2 DDPP
eeW mm
)**)1((
2
1 22
DDPP ecec gg ---
However, asymmetric career have an ambiguous e¤ect on the settlement amount
when the attorney with stronger career concerns is the one with no bargaining power.
Recall from Section 4.2 that the expected probability of prevailing in Court is larger
for the attorney with stronger career concerns. A similar e¤ect on the outcome of
bargaining arises for asymmetric costs and asymmetric priors.Table 3 also reports
the bargaining outcomes under the notion of Nash (1950)s bargaining solution. As
shown in the Table, an increase in the career concerns of the attorneys does not
a¤ect the settlement amount when both attorneys have the same career concerns.
However, the settlement outcome does change when the attorneys have di¤erent career
concerns. When increasing the career concerns of AP while ADs career concerns
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remain unchanged, then S increases and AP obtains a better outcome while AD
is worse o¤.45 Analogously, when increasing the career concerns of AD, then S
decreases and AD obtains a better outcome while AP is worse o¤.46 A similar e¤ect
on the outcome of bargaining arises for asymmetric costs and asymmetric priors.
In the last of the bargaining solutions considered in Table 3, the attorney making
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er is chosen randomly where  represents the probability that
AP is the proposer. As shown in the middle column of the Table, raising  increases
is payo¤ if she is the attorney that is more likely to propose. However, if both
attorneys are equally likely to propose (i.e., if  = 1=2), then raising  has no e¤ect
on the settlement amount. Notice that the Nash bargaining outcome coincides with
the outcome when both attorneys are equally likely to be the proposer (i.e., when
 = 1=2): Therefore, career concerns reinforce again the position of the party with
larger bargaining power.
Modeling the trial outcomes sensitivity to the attorneysperformance
In this section I study how previous results are a¤ected by the trial outcomes
sensitivity to the performance of the attorneys. The sensitivity of the trial outcome
might vary depending on the type of case, on the type of court that makes the
decision, or on the type of legal system. For instance, verdicts from judges and verdicts
from juries sometimes di¤er, as studied by previous research.47 In my particular
framework, it could be that juries are more sensitive to the skills of the attorneys
(e.g., communication skills), while judges might focus more on the merits of the case.
Similarly, the outcome of the trial in the adversarial system perhaps depends more on
the talents of the attorneys while in the inquisitorial system the skills of the lawyers
might not be as important. As argued by Glendon et al. (1982) in civil law countries
45This is true except if P increases to the extent that e

P + e

D > 2W=c:
46This is true except if D increases to the extent that e

P + e

D > 2W=c:
47See Spier (2007) for an overview of some of the results.
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"the judge may inject new theories, new legal and factual sides, thus reducing the
disadvantage of the party with the less competent lawyer."
An interesting feature of the form assumed for is that it is possible to parametrize
the level of sensitivity, as noticed by Che and Gale (2000). Let the probability of AP
prevailing in Court, ; take now the form:
(eP ; eD; tP ; tD) =
1 + s(eP tP   eDtD)
2
; (36)
where smeasures the sensitivity of the trial outcome to the di¤erence in the attorneys
performance. When s = 0 the outcome of the trial is completely insensitive to
the performance of the attorneys. In contrast, when s is large, a slightly better
performance implies a large probability of winning the case. For simplicity in the
analysis, I will restrict the sensitivity to be s 2 [0; 1]: Notice that the results in
previous sections correspond to the case where s = 1:
The expected probability of AP prevailing in Court is then given by:
Et((eP ; e

D; tP ; tD)) =
1
2
+
s(P eP   DeD)
2
;
where P and D are APs and ADs a priori expected talents, respectively. Substi-
tuting this expected probability, it is possible to solve the maximization problems of
AP and AD from Section 2. As shown in the Appendix, the di¤erence between the
markets inference about tP in case of AP winning and in case of AP losing can be
written as follows:
t^P (AP wins; e

P ; e

D)  t^P (AP loses; eP ; eD) =
2seP
2
P
1  s2(P eP   DeD)2
:
79
Similarly for tD:
t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D)  t^D(AP wins; eP ; eD) =
2seD
2
D
1  s2(ePP   eDD)2
:
As shown in the following proposition, the e¤ect of career concerns on the level of
e¤ort depends on the level of sensitivity.
Proposition 22 Holding e¤ort xed, the more sensitive is the trial outcome to the
performance of the attorneys, the more informative it is about the attorneystalent.
More specically, t^P (AP wins; eP ; e

D) and t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D) are increasing in
s, while t^P (AP loses; eP ; e

D) and t^D(AP wins; e

P ; e

D) are decreasing in s. Further-
more, when the trials outcome is completely insensitive to the attorneys performance
(i.e., s = 0), career concerns have no e¤ect because the outcome of the trial is not
informative about the talent of the attorneys.
Proof. See the Appendix.
As a consequence, a more informative trial outcome amplies the e¤ect of career
concerns on the choice of e¤ort. For instance, when the prior of the attorneystalent
coincides and both attorneys have the same career concerns and cost functions, then:
eP = e

D =
Ws=2
c  s22 :
Thus, e¤ort levels are increasing in s. Notice that @2ei =@@s > 0: The e¤ect of career
concerns on e¤ort is increasing in the trial outcomes sensitivity, s. As a consequence,
the additional gains from settlement due to the e¤ect of career concerns are also
increasing in the level of sensitivity, s. Intuitively, the more sensitive is the trial
outcome, the more aggressive are the attorneys in court.
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The e¤ect of career concerns on the conict of interest between the
plainti¤ and her attorney
As described in Dana and Spier (1993), contingent fees are the most pervasive
form of payment in personal injury and medical malpractice litigation.As they also
explain, contingent fees are rarely used by defendants. Contingent fees provide insuf-
cient incentives for the attorney, whose optimal e¤ort level is below the plainti¤s
aim (Polinsky and Rubinfeld, 2003). To examine the e¤ect of career concerns on this
misalignment of interests, I assume that AP is compensated through a contingent fee
while the defendant has aligned interests with her client. The alignment of interests
may arise if there is a repeated interaction between the defendant and her attorney.
For instance, in a large number of cases, defendants are corporations with in-house
lawyers or that have a long-term contractual relationship with a specic law rm.
Thus, I assume that AP is compensated only if she wins the trial and that AD
has aligned interests with her client. For simplicity, I assume that the attorneys
cost functions and the priors on their talents coincide. Denoting by  2 (0; 1] the
exogenously-given48 fraction of the Court award kept by AP , then AP chooses the
level of e¤ort in order to solve the following problem:
max
eP2[0;1]
W  Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD)) 
ce2P
2
+ P  fEt((eP ; eD; tP ; tD))  t^P (AP wins; eP ; eD)
+Et(1  (eP ; eD; tP ; tD))  t^P (AP loses; eP ; eD)g;
where eP denotes the markets conjecture about APs equilibrium e¤ort when she is
compensated via a contingent fee, and eD denotes APs and the markets conjecture
about ADs equilibrium level of e¤ort when AP is compensated via a contingent fee.
Following the same procedure as in Section 3, the interior optimal level of e¤ort, eP ,
48I consider  to be exogenous in the present stage of the game wherein attorneys are choosing
e¤ort levels. Solving by backwards induction allows me to endogeneize  if I introduce an initial
contractual stage between AP and P , prior to the settlement stage. Notice that modeling the
contractual stage requires having the results for the e¤ort choice and for the settlement stage.
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must then satisfy49:
W
2
= eP

c  P
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

: (37)
Since ADs interests are aligned with her clientsinterests, then eD satises the
same condition as in Section 3:
W
2
= eD

c  D
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

: (38)
In any possible equilibrium50 both conditions are satised which leads to:
eP


c  P
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

= eD

c  D
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

: (39)
Notice that when AP has no career concerns (i.e., P = 0); then e

P = W=2c:
This level of e¤ort is a lower bound of eP since for any  > 0; the expression in
parentheses in equation (24) is smaller than c. Notice also that when AD has no
career concerns (i.e., D = 0); then e

D = W=2c: When P = D = 0, there are no
strategic interactions between the attorneys.
When P = D; then e

P = e

D: Intuitively, since AP is obtaining only a fraction
 of the Court award, her incentives are lower than those of AD. Therefore, in equi-
librium AD exerts higher e¤ort than AP . As a consequence, the expected probability
that AP prevails in Court is Efg < 1=2:
Alternatively, when P > D then e

P > e

D. These has implications for the
plainti¤s payo¤, (1  )WEfg, as shown in the following Proposition.
Proposition 23 When AP is compensated through a contingent fee, and AD has
aligned interests with her client (given everything else equal) and starting from P =
49In order to ensure that in equilibrium eP 2 (0; 1); I assume that c > W=2+ P2=(1  2).
For the case of AD; I assume c > W=2 + D
2=(1  2) as in Section 3.
50It may be that more than one pair (eP ; e

D) satises the conditions above.
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D = ; an increase in P holding D xed implies that:
i) APs equilibrium e¤ort level, eP ; increases and ADs equilibrium e¤ort, e

D; de-
creases.
Thus, Efg increases.
ii) The plainti¤ s payo¤ increases:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Therefore, career concerns may help align the interests between the plainti¤ and
her client. However, the career concerns of the opposing lawyer matter. Moreover, a
larger P increases the e¤ort costs of the attorney and thus, it does not necessarily
increase APs payo¤. As a consequence, it could a¤ect the misalignment of interests
in settlement described in Miller (1987).
Misaligned interests in the settlement stage arise because an attorney compensated
through a contingent fee pays all the costs in the event of trial. Thus, the concession
limit of the attorney is lower than the concession limit of the plainti¤when the lawyer
exerts a strictly positive level of e¤ort. I assume for simplicity that the contingent fee
is the same in case of settlement and in case of trial. Then, the plainti¤s concession
limit is given by:
(1  )S  (1  )WEfg:
In contrast, AP is willing to accept the defendants settlement o¤er as long as:
S  WEfg   c(e

P )
2
2
:
Therefore APs concession limit is necessarily smaller than her clients concession
limit when eP > 0. More specically, for any settlement o¤er:
S 2

WEfg   c(e

P )
2
2
; WEfg

;
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AP is willing to accept S and avoid going to trial, while her client is better o¤ by
going to court.
Since stronger career concerns (i.e., larger P ) implies that AP exerts more e¤ort
in equilibrium, this implies a larger range of settlement o¤ers for which the interests
of the attorney and her client are misaligned. Notice that the di¤erence between
Ps and APs concession limits is c(eP )
2=2 which is increasing in APs e¤ort level.
Career concerns also a¤ect the attorneyse¤ort and settlement decisions when they
are compensated on an hourly fee basis and the clients cannot observe the attorneys
e¤ort levels. This case can be modeled using a framework as in Garoupa and Gomez
(2008).
Conclusion
As shown in this paper, when lawyers have career concerns, their equilibrium e¤ort
levels increase and strategic e¤ects in their decisions arise. Moreover, stronger career
concerns increase the surplus from settlement, a¤ect the partiesconcession limits and
may a¤ect the bargaining outcome. In particular, if a party has a larger bargaining
power than the other party, stronger career concerns reinforce such advantage and lead
to an even more benecial settlement agreement. For instance, if the defendant has all
the bargaining power (as shown by Schwartz and Wickelgren (2000) the outcome of
this case coincides with the outcome of an alternating-o¤er bargaining game with an
indenite number of possible o¤ers and counter-o¤ers), hiring a lawyer with stronger
career concerns than the plainti¤s lawyer may be benecial for the defendant because
it leads to a decrease in the settlement outcome.
This paper contributes to the career concerns literature by studying a model with
two opposing agents where performance is determined by a contest success function.
A lawyer is then not only a¤ected by her own career concerns, but also by the ca-
reer concerns of her opponent. Consequently, there are interesting interaction e¤ects
between the parties. For instance, hiring a lawyer with strong career concerns may
84
help align the interest between the plainti¤ and her lawyer; however, such alignment
depends on how strong are the career concerns relatively to the opposing lawyer.
Throughout the paper I have assumed that attorneys do not have private informa-
tion about their own talents. This assumption is reasonable for inexperienced lawyers;
however, lawyers obtain information about their capabilities as they gain experience.
The analysis done in this paper could be extended to attorneys observing a private
and noisy signal about their own talent. In addition, I have assumed that when two
attorneys perform the same (in terms of the product of e¤ort and talent), they are
equally likely to win the trial. However, some cases have di¤erent merits than others.
Career concerns may a¤ect the type of case that attorneys accept. Being able to
win a di¢ cult case may enhance signicantly the career of a lawyer. In addition, the
negative impact of losing the case on the attorneys career may be small if the case
was di¢ cult. Therefore, the decision of whether to take a case or not may be more
related to implicit career incentives (e.g., the prospect of earnings growth upon win-
ning) than to explicit incentives (e.g., the expected compensation of the attorney).
Finally, further analysis may examine the e¤ect of career concerns on the contractual
stage between attorneys and clients. In particular, it would be interesting to deter-
mine when stronger career concerns imply that the plainti¤s attorney is willing to
accept a lower contingent fee.
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Appendix
Derivation of the markets inference about tP and tD:
This part of the Appendix contains the derivation of the di¤erence in markets
inference about tP and tD. Following Bayesrule, the markets inference about tP
when AP wins can be rewritten as:
t^P (AP wins; e

P ; e

D) = 
h
P  PrfhP j AP winsg+  lP  Prf lP j AP winsg =
=
hP  PrfAP winsjhPgPrfhPg
PrfAP winsg +
 lP  PrfAP winsj lPgPrf lPg
PrfAP winsg
= hP 
PEtD((e

P ; e

D; tD; tP = 
h
P )
Et((eP ; e

D; tP ; tD))
+
+ lP 
(1  P )EtD((eP ; eD; tD; tP =  lP )
Et((eP ; e

D; tP ; tD))
=
P   eDPD + eP   P
1 + (ePP   eDD)
;
where  P = P (
h
P )
2 + (1  P )( lP )2:
Conversely, when AP loses:
t^P (AP loses; e

P ; e

D) = 
h
P  PrfhP j AP losesg+  lP  Prf lP j AP losesg =
=
hP  PrfAP losesjhPgPrfhPg
PrfAP losesg +
 lP  PrfAP losesj lPgPrf lPg
PrfAP losesg
= hP 
P (1  EtD((eP ; eD; tD; tP = hP ))
(1  Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD))
+
+ lP 
(1  P )(1  EtD((eP ; eD; tD; tP =  lP ))
(1  Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD))
=
P + e

DPD   eP   P
1  (ePP   eDD)
:
Therefore, letting ePP   eDD be K:
t^P (AP wins; e

P ; e

D)  t^P (AP loses; eP ; eD) =
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=
P   eDPD + eP   P  K(P   eDPD + eP   P )
(1 +K)  (1 K) +
+
 P   eDPD + eP   P  K(P + eDPD   eP   P )
(1 +K)  (1 K)
=
2eP   P   2eDPD   2KP
1 K2 =
=
2eP   P   2eDPD   2P (ePP   eDD)
1  (ePP   eDD)2
=
=
2eP ( P   2P )
1  (ePP   eDD)2
=
2eP
2
P
1  (ePP   eDD)2
:
Regarding the defendants attorney, the markets inference about tD when AP
loses can be rewritten as:
t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D) = 
h
D  PrfhD j AP losesg+  lD  Prf lD j AP losesg =
= hD 
D(1  EtP ((eP ; eD; tP ; tD = hD))
(1  Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD))
+
+ lD 
(1  D)(1  EtP ((eP ; eD; tP ; tD =  lD))
(1  Et((eP ; eD; tP ; tD))
=
=
D   ePPD + eD   D
1  (ePP   eDD)
:
where  D = D(
h
D)
2 + (1  D)( lD)2:
Conversely, when AP wins:
t^D(AP wins; e

P ; e

D) = 
h
D  PrfhD j AP winsg+  lD  Prf lD j AP winsg =
= hD 
D  EtP ((eP ; eD; tP ; tD = hD))
Et((eP ; e

D; tP ; tD))
+
+ lD 
(1  D)EtP ((eP ; eD; tP ; tD =  lD)
Et((eP ; e

D; tP ; tD))
=
D + e

PPD   eD   D
1 + (ePP   eDD)
:
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Therefore, again letting ePP   eDD be K:
t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D)  t^D(AP wins; eP ; eD) =
=
D   ePPD + eD   D +K(D   ePPD + eD   D)
(1 +K)  (1 K) +
+
 D   ePPD + eD   D +K(D + ePPD   eD   D)
(1 +K)  (1 K)
=
eD   D   2ePPD + 2D(ePP   eDD)
1 K2 =
=
2eD( D   2D)
1  (ePP   eDD)2
=
2eD
2
D
1  (ePP   eDD)2
:
Proof of Proposition 4:
To compare the equilibrium e¤ort levels in the case of asymmetric priors with the
equilibrium e¤ort levels of the symmetric case, I will denote the former as ei and e

j ,
while e denotes the latter.
i) Since i = j; then:
W
2
= ej

c  
2
j
1  2(eP   eD)2

= ej

c  
2
i
1  2(eP   eD)2

:
Thus, 2j < 
2
i implies that e

j < e

i :
ii) Comparing the rst-order conditions of the asymmetric priors case with the rst-
order conditions of the symmetric case for j:
W
2
= ej

c  
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

= e
 
c  2 :
Thus, ej > e
: Since ej < e

i as shown in part i), then e
 < ei :
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Derivation of the markets inference about tP and tD given a level of
sensitivity s:
This part of the Appendix contains the derivation of the di¤erence in the markets
inference about tP and tD considering the sensitivity of the trials outcome to the
performance of the attorneys, s: Letting "i denote sei, then  takes the form:
(eP ; eD; tP ; tD) =
1 + "P tP   "DtD
2
;
which is equivalent to the form used above to compute the markets inference about
tP and tD when s = 1: Thus
t^P (AP wins; e

P ; e

D)  t^P (AP loses; eP ; eD) =
=
2"P
2
P
1  ("PP   "DD)2
=
2seP
2
P
1  s2(ePP   eDD)2
;
and similarly:
t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D)  t^D(AP wins; eP ; eD) =
=
2"D
2
D
1  ("PP   "DD)2
=
2seD
2
D
1  s2(ePP   eDD)2
:
Proof of Proposition 8:
Using the expressions found above in Case 3 for t^P (AP wins; eP ; e

D), t^P (AP
loses; eP ; e

D), t^D(AP wins; e

P ; e

D), and t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D), the derivatives with
respect to s are:
@t^P (AP wins; e

P ; e

D)
@s
=
eP
2
P
(1 + s(ePP   eDD))2
> 0;
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@t^P (AP loses; e

P ; e

D)
@s
=
 eP2P
(1  s(ePP   eDD))2
< 0
@t^D(AP wins; e

P ; e

D)
@s
=
 eD2D
(1 + s(ePP   eDD))2
< 0
@t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D)
@s
=
eD
2
D
(1  s(ePP   eDD))2
> 0
Finally, when s = 0, then career concerns have no e¤ect because t^P (AP wins; eP ; e

D) 
t^P (AP loses; e

P ; e

D) = t^D(AP loses; e

P ; e

D)  t^D(AP wins; eP ; eD) = 0:
Proof of Proposition 9:
i) First, if P > D it must be that eP > e

D: Notice that e

P = e

D is not
possible as it can be shown by contradiction. If it was possible then:
eP


c  P
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

= eD

c  P
2
1  2(eD(  1))2

:
But then:
eD

c  P
2
1  2(eD(  1))2

> eD

c  D
2
1  2(eD(  1))2

;
which contradicts equation (26). Similarly, if eP < e

D then again for P > D :
eP


c  P
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

< eD

c  P
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

;
which would also contradict equation (26).
Therefore, if P increases above D ; then (e

P   eD)2 decreases. Hence, since D
remains xed it must be that eD decreases in order to satisfy:
W
2
= eD

c  D
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

:
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In addition, eP must increase in order to satisfy:
W
2
= eP

c  P
2
1  2(eP   eD)2

;
given that (eP   eD)2 decreases and P increases.
ii) The plainti¤s payo¤ is given by:
(1  )WEfg = (1  )W

1
2
+
(eP   eD)
2

:
Thus, increase in P holding D, increases Efg and the plainti¤s payo¤.
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CHAPTER IV
OVERWORKING TO WIN THE CASE: REPRESENTING CASES IN
COURT AND YOUNG LAWYERSHOURS OF WORK
Introduction
Lawyers are among the highest paid professionals but they also work more hours
than the average college graduate (Rosen, 1992). It is common for lawyers to be
blamed for the high cost of litigation and, in fact, lawyerslong hours of work could
be a possible source of the problem. However, it may be that trials trap lawyers
into working longer hours because of the e¤ect of winning or losing a case on their
reputation. This e¤ect may be particularly true for young lawyers because there is
more uncertainty about their skills and thus they have more to win or lose from a
case in terms of reputation.
This paper uses condential survey data on young lawyersweekly hours to de-
termine whether representing cases in court creates additional incentives for lawyers
to work more hours. I separate the representative sample of young lawyers working
in US law rms into those representing cases in court (treatment group) and those
who are not (control group). I study di¤erences in the number of hours worked of
these two groups. Di¤erences between these two groups could be due to the law rms
assigning court cases to lawyers that are willing to work more hours, for instance to
those with a lower disutility of work. Hence, I also test whether lawyers representing
cases in court also work signicantly more hours than what is expected from them.
This allows me to control for some unobservable heterogeneities that may a¤ect the
job assignment, such as a taste for leisure.
Theoretical results in Ferrer (2009a) show that the equilibrium e¤ort level in court
is increasing in lawyerscareer concerns and in the uncertainty about their talent.
Intuitively, the market will infer that lawyers winning cases are talented lawyers
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and hence their prospective earnings will increase. Thus, lawyers with strong career
concerns will work more hours attempting to a¤ect the markets belief about their
talent.
To test this hypothesis, I focus on survey data of lawyers that passed the bar ex-
amination two years prior to responding to the survey. I nd that lawyers representing
cases in court work signicantly more than the rest of lawyers working in law rms.
This result is robust when estimating alternative possible specications. Moreover,
the results suggest that lawyers representing cases in court work more hours due to
incentive e¤ects rather than due to selection e¤ects.
There are several reasons why I focus on young lawyers. First, career concerns are
expected to be stronger for young lawyers. Second, I want to test whether lawyers
work more hours even when there is no signaling or screening involved. Young lawyers
are likely to have as much uncertainty about their talent as the market does, and thus,
there is little room for private information.
The next subsection discusses related research. Section 2 describes the data and
relevant theoretical results. Section 3 presents the estimation methodology. Sections
4 and 5 present the results and robustness tests. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
Related literature
The legal profession has attracted researchersattention for a number of reasons
such as studying the gender gap in lawyerswages (Wood et al., 1993, Noonan et al.,
2008), studying lawyersjob mobility (Sauer, 1998), determining the e¤ect of beauty
on their earnings (Biddle and Hamermesh, 1998) or providing a rationale for law
rmsspecic promotion rules (OFlaherty and Siow, 1995). However, relatively little
has been written about the labor supply of lawyers.51 In particular, to my knowledge
51To my knowledge, the only exception is a short section in the study of the legal industry during
the period 1967-1987 by Rosen (1992). The main nding related to hours of work is that the variation
of lawyersearnings along a life-cycle pattern is considerably larger than the variation of hours of
work in such pattern.
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there have been no studies that explore the e¤ect of representing cases in court on
lawyershours of work.
The most related paper to mine is Landers et al. (1996), which nds that lawyers
prefer a decrease in the hours of work to a commensurate increase in the salary. They
asked lawyers of two major law rms in the United States to decide between three
hypothetical changes in their current income and work hours. The results show that
almost two thirds of the associate lawyers in the sample were interested in decreasing
their hours of work. Specically, 65.1 percent chose a decrease in their work hours
while keeping the same income. In contrast, only 25.56 percent preferred to keep
their hours of work unchanged and have an increase of 5 percent in their income.
Finally, only 9.02 percent chose an increase of 5 percent in hours and 10 percent in
income. The authors conclude that law rms are "organizational settings in which
professionals employees are required to work ine¢ ciently long hours." Their argument
is that law rms induce lawyers to overwork as a screening device.52 Lawyers in their
model have private information on the taste for leisure. In contrast, I argue that
lawyers overwork due to an incentive e¤ect rather than to a selection e¤ect.
This paper is also related to the empirical literature on contract incentives (for a
survey see Chiappori and Salanié, 2002). For instance, Paarsch and Shearer (2000)
compare the productivities of workers at a tree-planting rm under two di¤erent
compensation systems: xed rate and piece rate. In contrast, this paper focuses on
incentive e¤ects that arise due to the career concerns of the attorneys instead of due
to a specic contract or form of compensation. However, as in these papers, my
objective is to separate the incentive e¤ect from possible selection e¤ects.
52Akerlo¤ (1976) was the rst to use a screening model to explain overwork.
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Finally, I use average treatment e¤ect estimation to measure the e¤ect of rep-
resenting cases in court. Thus, the literature on treatment e¤ects is closely related
(see for instance, Heckman et al., 1999), although it is generally used to estimate the
e¤ects of policies, education or training programs on individualsbehavior.
Career concerns and data characteristics
Implications from the theoretical analysis of career concerns
In a seminal article, Holmström (1982, 1999) shows that career concerns provide
an implicit incentive that induces agents to exert more e¤ort. However, the results
also show that this incentive e¤ect is smaller as the uncertainty about agentsskills
decreases. Thus, in the case of trial lawyers, as they accumulate experience in court,
the more the market learns about their performance. As a consequence, the mar-
ket obtains more precise information and the uncertainty about the lawyers skills
decreases. Thus, the e¤ect of career concerns is expected to be stronger for young
lawyers.
In addition, in a model where two lawyers are facing each other in court, Fer-
rer (2009a) shows that career concerns create strategic interactions between the two
lawyers which may amplify the implicit incentive e¤ect. In particular, Ferrer shows
that career concerns create an equilibrium e¤ort trap for the two lawyers. Thus, there
are two ways in which career concerns induce lawyers to provide more e¤ort in court.
First, since e¤ort is unobservable, lawyers with career concerns attempt to manipu-
late the markets inference on their talent by working more hours. The results show
that lawyers work more hours even though the market makes the correct inference on
the attorneystalents in equilibrium (i.e., even though the market cannot be fooled in
equilibrium). Second, the e¤ort level of a lawyer is a¤ected by her opponents career
concerns. In particular, the model illustrates how the lawyers equilibrium e¤ort level
increases when facing an opponent with stronger career concerns.
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In contrast, information on performance is more di¤use for lawyers that do not
represent cases in court. Lawyers writing contracts or providing legal advice to clients
are evaluated in terms of more diverse and frequent outcomes. Thus, each of the tasks
is very unlikely to have an e¤ect on the lawyerscareers as relevant as the e¤ect of
the trial outcome for lawyers representing cases in court.
The data
The After the JD Studyis a national condential survey of law graduates. This
study, sponsored by the American Bar Foundation (ABF), the National Association
for Legal Placement (NALP), and other legal associations, tracks the professional
careers of lawyers that passed the bar examination for the rst time in 2000.53 The
rst wave of the survey was obtained in 2002. The respondents in the sample are
young lawyers from 18 di¤erent legal markets in the United States including the four
largest markets, namely New York, Washington D.C., Chicago and Los Angeles.
A committee of social scientists designated by the ABF and the NALP selected
a ten percent (approximately) representative sample of the roughly 40,000 lawyers
that were accepted to the bar in 2000 in the United States. Among the lawyers in
the sample of the "After the JD Study," I focus on those working full-time in law
rms. I am excluding from the analysis those respondents that work part-time, for
the government, or for non-prot sectors. This allows me to concentrate on those
who may have stronger career concerns. The sample size of the respondents working
full-time in law rms is 2282. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of all lawyers
working full-time while Table 2 reports the statistics of lawyers working in law rms.
As explained below, I also excluded from both tables those lawyers who reported
to be on vacation the week they were asked about hours of work. Variables white,
53The sample is restricted to those who passed the bar examination for the rst time in order for
all the members of the cohort to have the same experience level. For instance, the sample excludes
lawyers that retook the bar examination in 2000 to practice law in a di¤erent state than initially.
For my analysis this restriction is useful because it ensures that all the lawyers in the sample are at
an early stage of their careers.
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NYDC, female and femalewithkids in Tables 1 and 2 are dummy variables. NYDC
indicates which respondents work in the two largest legal markets, namely New York
and Washington D.C.
TABLE 7 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF LAWYERS IN THE AJD STUDY
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Hours of work per week 50.19 11.86
Hours expected to work 46.53 8.80
Annual salary 86,094 50,156
Age 31.45 5.50
Female .43 .49
Female with kids .07 .26
NYDC .18 .38
White .70 .46
Source: “The After the JD Study”. Respondents working part-time or that were on
vacation the week they were asked about hours of work have been excluded
Not surprisingly, Tables 1 and 2 illustrate that the average salary for lawyers
working in law rms is $12,000 above the average salary of the whole sample, even
though the average number of working hours is not considerably larger. Although
not shown in the table, the di¤erence in salaries is even larger when comparing the
median salary of each group. Di¤erences with respect to gender, age and race between
the two tables do not seem noteworthy. In both tables the average age is roughly 31,
slightly above forty percent of the respondents are female, and around 16 percent of
the female lawyers have kids.
TABLE 8 – DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF LAWYERS IN LAW FIRMS
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Hours of work per week 51.38 11.71
Hours expected to work 47.94 8.72
Annual salary 98,080 49,434
Court .26 .44
Number lawyers in the firm 253.39 397.23
Number lawyers same office 90.76 128.28
Age 30.96 4.94
Female .41 .49
Female with kids .07 .25
NYDC .17 .38
White .72 .45
Source: “The After the JD Study”. Respondents working part-time or that were on
vacation the week they were asked about hours of work have been excluded
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The survey data provides information about the lawyerssalaries, hours of work,
type and size of organization where they work, reported job satisfaction, and so
on. My primary variable of interest is the lawyers reported hours of work. The
survey asked lawyers "How many hours did you actually work last week, even if it
was atypical?" in order to obtain a more precise and sincere answer than if referring
to an average number of hours per week. There was a space available for lawyers to
ll out. Around 8 percent of the lawyers in the sample reported to be on vacation
that specic week and thus reported zero hours of work. I exclude those individuals
from the sample; however, the main results of the paper hold when I include them
and identify them using a dummy variable.
Variable court in Table 2 is the variable that allows me to distinguish between
lawyers frequently representing cases in court (treatment group) and those who do
not (control group). This variable is constructed using question 16.e in the survey
which asks "Over the total legal matters you worked on over the past three months,
on how many of them were you appearing in court as a rst or second chair on a
case?" The emphasis on being "rst or second chair" on a case is relevant. In order
for career concerns to induce additional incentives, it is important that the name of
the lawyer is associated to the case. In contrast, simply participating in discussions
about a case or providing assistance does not seem as relevant for lawyersreputation.
The possible responses to question 16.e were "none," "some," "half," "most,"
and "all." I consider that lawyers that answered "none" or "some" do not frequently
represent cases in court and thus spend most of their time in other activities such as
writing contracts, providing legal advice, etc. Therefore, court is a binary indicator
that takes value one when respondents report "half", "most", "all" and zero otherwise.
Section 4.3 discusses the robustness of the results to changes in the role of "half" and
"some" in variable court. The treatment group consists of those respondents for which
court =1. The response of the median respondent was "some" while the mode was
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"none." Around 25 percent of the respondents working in law rms responded "half",
"most" or "all."
Finally, the data also contains information about the educational background
of the lawyers. In particular, there is bracketed information of the ranking of the
law school from where the lawyers graduated gathered in variable reputschool and
based on U.S. news 2003 law schoolsranking) and bracketed information about their
reported class rank and GPA during their law school education.
Estimation methodology
I use average treatment e¤ect estimation to study the di¤erence in hours of work
between lawyers representing cases in court (treatment group) and the rest of lawyers
working in law rms (control group). The estimate of the average treatment e¤ect:
ATE  E[hours court lawyers  hours no court lawyers];
will allow me to evaluate whether those representing cases in court have incentives to
work more hours, as predicted by the theoretical analysis.
The standard regression analysis
The di¤erence in sample means (also called di¤erence in means estimator) would be
an unbiased and consistent estimator of the average treatment e¤ect if the assignment
to represent cases in court was completely random (e.g., the outcome of ipping a
coin). In the sample, I nd that lawyers in the treatment group work on average two
hours more than lawyers in the control group. That is:
E[hours j court = 1]  E[hours j court = 0] = 2:04:
However, if the assignment is based on lawyerspersonal characteristics (which seems
clearly more realistic) then the di¤erence in sample means is not a valid estimator. If
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these personal characteristics are observable in the data then it is possible to assume
that hours of work of the treatment and hours of work of the control group are
conditional mean independent of the value of court once we partial out the other
regressors in the model. Specically, this is the assumption known as ignorability of
treatment:
ASS 1:a : E[hours court j x; court] = E[hours court j x];
ASS 1:b : E[hours no-court j x; court] = E[hours no-court j x];
where x is the vector of observed covariates in the model.
Denoting hours of work for no-court lawyers as hours0, and hours of work for
court lawyers as hours1; then using a parametric regression method:
hours0 = 0 + v0; (40)
hours1 = 1 + v1; (41)
where E[v0] = 0 and E[v1] = 0:
Under ignorability of the treatment, then:
ATE = E[hours1 hours0jw; x] = E[hours1 hours0jx] = E[1 0jx]+E[v1 v0jx]:
Thus:
Hours of work = 0 + (1   0)(court) + (v1   v0)(court) + v0:
If, in addition, v1 v0 has zero conditional mean, then a valid estimate of the average
treatment is the coe¢ cient for the dummy variable court, 1   0; as discussed in
Wooldridge (2002). Hence, I estimate the following standard regression model for
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hours of work:
Hours of work = 0 + Court+ x; (42)
where  is the average treatment e¤ect and the vector of observed covariates, x,
includes the annual salary, the size of the rm and its square, the size of the lawyers
specic o¢ ce, the lawyersage and its square, variables for the lawyerseducational
background and dummy variables for females with kids and for those lawyers working
in New York City or Washington DC.
An alternative dependent variable to address selection problems
Assumptions 1.a and 1.b would not hold if the assignment to represent cases in court
was done on the basis of characteristics not observable in the data. For instance, a
potential problem would be if the law rms can distinguish lawyers by their taste for
leisure and use this information for the job assignment. In such case, assumptions
1.a. and 1.b. would be violated because court would not be fully determined by the
observable personal characteristics.
To address this problem of possible unobservable heterogeneities, I introduce an
alternative dependent variable using the response to question 11.b in the survey "How
many hours are you expected to work during a typical week at your job?" Subtracting
the hours expected to work from the hours of work allows me to control for charac-
teristics that are observable by the law rm but not available in the data. I call the
resulting variable hours beyond expected.
Thus, the assumptions would then be:
ASS 1:c : E[Hours beyond exp: court j x; court] = E[Hours beyond exp: court j x];
ASS 1:d : E[Hours beyond exp: no-court j x; court] = E[Hours beyond exp: no-court j x];
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Under these assumptions, I estimate the average treatment e¤ect using the fol-
lowing specication:
Hours beyond expected 
Hours of work - Hours expected to work = 0 + Court+ x; (43)
where  is the average treatment e¤ect and where the vector of observed covariates,
x; is the same as in the previous subsection.
This approach allows me address the problem of job assignments based on unob-
servable characteristics of the lawyers; however, it does not rule out the possibility
of court being endogenous. In particular, it could be that the assignment of young
lawyers to court is determined by hours of work rather than the other way around.
However, this possibility seems unlikely considering two specic characteristics of the
data. First, respondents were asked to report how many hours they had worked in
the previous week, while court is constructed based on a question about legal matters
on which they had worked in the past three months. Therefore, if lawyers represent-
ing cases in court had worked very hard prior to obtain the court assignment (i.e.,
to self-select themselves), this e¤ect would not show in their answer to the question
about their past weeks hours of work. Second, lawyers in the sample have only two
years of experience. It could be that the lawyers representing cases in court are very
hardworking because being trial lawyers is a vocational choice for them. However,
one would then expect them to have shown it during their recent graduate school
education. That is, one would expect them to have a higher GPA or to have gone
to a better ranked law school. In contrast, I nd that GPA and reputschool are
bad predictors of the lawyershours of work. Moreover, GPA and reputschool have
negative coe¢ cients (highly signicant in the case of GPA) as explanatory variables
for court.
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Endogeneity of the annual salary
Salary is potentially endogenous in this regression since hours of work and the
annual salary may be determined simultaneously. If salary is endogenous in equations
(3) and (4), this could a¤ect the estimate of court. Thus, I also estimate these
equations using instrumental variables for salary.
To construct the instruments I use the reported salary of individuals in the "After
the JD Study" sample that do not work in law rms.54 Specically, I obtain four
di¤erent instruments by computing the average salary per region of those lawyers
working for the federal government, for the state and local government, for the pri-
vate industry (e.g., accounting, investment banking, consulting) and for non-prot
organizations. Then, separately for each of the four types of organizations, I assign
the corresponding average salary of the region to the subjects of interest (lawyers
working in law rms). The resulting variables are slryfedgov, slryregiongov, slrynon-
prot and slryindustry. Since there are 18 regions in the study, each instrumental
variable has 18 possible values.
Using these instruments for salary, I estimate equations (3) and (4) using a two-
stage least-squares procedure. Slryfedgov, slryregiongov, slrynonprot and slryindus-
try appear to be legitimate instruments because they are highly correlated with the
salaries of lawyers working in law rms but not correlated with their hours of work.
Intuitively, an important determinant of the salary is the cost of living of the region;
thus, in a region with a high cost of living, salaries will be higher than usual in law
rms as well as in government jobs, non-prot organizations and in the private in-
dustry. In fact, the rst-stage regression of salary on the four instruments provides
a reasonably high R2: In addition, the instruments appear to be legitimate because
there is no apparent reason why the average salary of lawyers working outside law
rms could be explained by the hours of work of lawyers working in law rms in that
54Even though these lawyers do not work in law rms, they also passed the bar examination in
2000.
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same region. In fact, they are uncorrelated.
The propensity score method
Lawyers in the sample may be part of the treatment group for di¤erent causes. For
instance, a law rm may assign a lawyer to represent cases in court because of her
educational background and a di¤erent lawyer because of her age. The propensity
score is a measure of the likelihood of being part of the treatment group. Estimating
the e¤ect of court when controlling for the estimated propensity score allows me
to match the lawyers by their likelihood of being the treatment group (following
Rosebaum and Rubin, 1983).
To nd the average treatment e¤ect I estimate  in the following model that uses
a propensity score method:
Hours of work = 0 + 1Court+ 2p^(x); (44)
where p^(x) is the propensity score which I obtain from a probit model of court on x.
Results
The standard regression model
Tables 3, 4 and 5 present the main results. Among lawyers working in law rms,
lawyers that represent cases in court work nearly ve hours more per week than
the rest. Variable court is highly signicant in all of the specications: including
salary as one of the covariates (Table 3), excluding salary (Table 4), and when using
instruments for salary (Table 5). Although not included in the tables, the result also
holds when introducing additional covariates, such as the number of children, and
dummy variables for race, for being a male lawyer with children and for working in a
large city. None of these variablescoe¢ cients were signicant.
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In addition, the results suggest that the di¤erence between the treatment and
the control group is due to incentive e¤ects rather than to selection e¤ects. Lawyers
representing cases in court work more hours even when controlling for the number of
hours that is expected from them. That is, as shown in columns (2A) and (2B) of
the tables, lawyers that represent cases in court work signicantly more hours beyond
what is expected from them than other young lawyers working in law rms. If the
law rm was able to select those lawyers with a lower disutility of work and send
them to court, then they will expect them to work more hours and court would not
be signicant (or as signicant) in columns (2A) and (2B). In contrast, we observe
that lawyers representing cases in court work more hours even though they are not
expected to do so; thus, going to court seems to induce lawyers to work more hours in
an implicit way. This result is consistent with Ferrer (2009a) that nds an equilibrium
e¤ort trap for trial lawyers due to their career concerns.
With respect to the e¤ect of salary, I nd that lawyers with higher annual salaries
work more hours. Therefore, it seems that in this case the substitution e¤ect domi-
nates the wealth e¤ect of higher earnings, although a more detailed analysis might be
needed. The coe¢ cient for salary is positive and signicant in all three tables, except
for columns (2A) and (2B) of Table 5. That is, the only case where the coe¢ cient for
salary is not signicant is when the dependent variable is hours beyond expected and
I use instruments for salary. This result suggests that the annual salary positively
a¤ects the weekly hours of work but does not have a clear e¤ect on lawyersdecision
to overwork (beyond what is expected from them).
Although not shown in the tables, it is worth mentioning the relation between
salary and other covariates. When estimating equations where salary is the dependent
variable, the coe¢ cients of reputschool and GPA are positive and signicant; that is,
those respondents from better law schools and who performed better in their classes
get signicantly higher salaries. The annual salary is also increasing in the size of the
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law rm and in the size of the o¢ ce, although this e¤ect is diminishing because the
squares of these variables have negative coe¢ cients. Finally, lawyers working in New
York or Washington D.C. have higher salaries, possibly due to higher costs of living.
TABLE 9: OLS Results including salary
Hours of work           Hours beyond expected
  (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B)
court 4.151** 4.658** 4.212** 4.442**
(5.15) (4.89) (3.82) (3.43)
logsalary 5.294** 5.584** 3.894* 4.364**
(5.80) (4.44) (2.84) (2.92)
sizefirm 0.001 0.002 -0.006* -0.006
(0.48) (0.54) (2.80) (2.06)
sizefirmsq -6.57·10-7 -9.02·10-7 2.09·10-6* 9.52·10-7
(0.48) (0.70) (2.15) (1.96)
sizeoffice 0.0004 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.07) (0.29) (0.78) (0.38)
age 0.675* 0.573 -0.091 -0.201
(2.22) (1.79) (0.19) (0.43)
agesq -0.009* -0.008* 0.003 0.005
(2.54) (2.15) (0.59) (0.93)
femalewithkids -2.464* -3.170* 0.493 0.700
(2.20) (2.43) (0.22) (0.27)
reputschool -3.573* -6.462**
(2.52) (3.63)
GPA -0.761 -2.968
(1.44) (2.06)
GPAreput 0.482 1.158*
(2.10) (2.77)
NYDC -0.438 -0.207
(0.29) (0.20)
Constant -22.214** -17.286 -41.281* -28.929
(2.99) (1.47) (2.69) (1.43)
Observations 965 834 965 834
R-squared 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.05
Source: “After the JD Study.” Sample includes lawyers working full time in law firms
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses, **significant at 1% , *significant at 5%
The results in Tables 3, 4 and 5 also suggest that female lawyers with children
work around three hours less than the rest of lawyers. Notice that the coe¢ cient of
femalewithkids is negative and signicant at 5% level in all columns (1A) and (1B) of
the tables, except for Column (1B) of Table 5 where it is signicant at 10% level. This
result is not surprising considering that lawyers in the sample are young (the average
age is 31, as shown in Table 2) and thus are likely to have small children. A large
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number of studies in the labor economics literature have found a negative correlation
between female labor supply and childbearing, although Angrist and Evans (1998)
nd that the e¤ect is much smaller for college educated women.
A perhaps more interesting result related to femalewithkids is that its coe¢ cient
is no longer signicant in columns (2A) and (2B) of any of the tables. Moreover,
it is positive (although not signicant) in Tables 3 and 5. This result suggests that
female lawyers with children work signicantly less but their employers also expect
them to work signicantly less. That is, female lawyers with children do not appear
to overwork (beyond what is expected from them) signicantly less that other indi-
viduals in the sample. Contrasting this result with the results for court; it is worth
highlighting that the e¤ect of representing cases in court persists when accounting for
the employers expectations of hours of work while the e¤ect of having children does
not.
Another remarkable result is that the coe¢ cient for reputschool is negative when
controlling also for the interaction between the reputation of the law school and the
grade point average of the respondent, GPAreput, which has a positive and signicant
coe¢ cient. This appears to indicate that young lawyers from better ranked law schools
that have a strong academic record work more hours, while young lawyers from better
ranked law schools work less in general. Notice that this seems particularly true in
columns (2A) and (2B); that is, when explaining young lawyersdecision to overwork
(beyond what is expected from them).
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TABLE 10: OLS Results excluding salary
    Hours of work           Hours beyond expected
  (1A) (1B) (2A) (2B)
court 3.699** 4.431** 3.919** 4.121**
(3.91) (4.20) (3.29) (2.96)
sizefirm 0.006* 0.006* -0.003 -0.002
(2.20) (2.23) (1.70) (1.01)
sizefirmsq -2·10-6 -2.2·10-6 1.07·10-6 6.2·10-7
(1.48) (-1.74) (1.32) (0.75)
sizeoffice 0.006 0.005 0.008* 0.003
(1.15) (0.68) (2.28) (0.58)
age 1.010** 0.952** 0.186 0.111
(3.79) (3.45) (0.40) (0.24)
agesq -0.014** -0.013** -0.001 0.0004
(4.46) (4.21) (0.15) (0.08)
femalewithkids -3.505** -4.007** -0.356 -0.039
(3.06) (3.13) (0.16) (0.01)
reputschool -3.081 -6.056**
(2.03) (3.27)
GPA -0.417 -2.623
(0.83) (1.90)
GPAreput 0.453 1.122*
(1.91) (2.63)
NYDC 0.699 0.700
(0.47) (0.77)
Constant 31.131** 35.372** -2.659 11.838
(5.83) (5.38) (0.28) (0.83)
Observations 1002 859 1002 859
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04
Source: “After the JD Study.” Sample includes lawyers working full time in law firms
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses, **significant at 1% , *significant at 5%
Table 5 shows the results when using the instruments for salary. The coe¢ cient for
court not only is still signicant but is also larger than in the OLS regressions. Lawyers
representing cases in court appear to work more than ve hours more per week than
other lawyers working in law rms. For these results I used slryfedgov, slryregiongov,
and slryindustry as instruments. Results are very similar when using also slrynonprot
as an instrument; however, that implies excluding Florida from the analysis because
there are no observations for lawyers working in non-prot organizations in the state
of Florida.
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TABLE 11: Results using IV for salary
    Hours of work           Hours beyond expected
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B)
court 4.250** 5.163** 4.526** 4.801**
(5.32) (4.94) (3.31) (3.22)
logsalary 5.861** 10.160** 5.709 7.777
(3.17) (3.23) (1.56) (1.38)
sizefirm 0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.009
(0.31) (0.55) (1.94) (1.61)
sizefirmsq -4.87·10-7 1.51·10-7 2.65·10-6 2.67·10-7
(0.40) (0.14) (1.74) (1.62)
sizeoffice -2.6·10-5 0.0003 0.002 0.001
(0.006) (0.03) (0.42) (0.14)
age 0.634* 0.244 -0.221 -0.449
(2.81) (0.92) (0.42) (0.96)
agesq -0.008** -0.003 0.005 0.008
(3.20) (1.05) (0.83) (1.42)
femalewithkids -2.363* -2.492 0.815 1.205
(2.24) (2.08) (0.33) (0.47)
reputschool -3.945* -6.749**
(2.64) (3.96)
GPA -1.057 -3.209*
(1.83) (2.24)
GPAreput 0.498* 1.172*
(2.17) (2.86)
NYDC -1.465 -1.012
(1.12) (0.54)
Constant -27.812 -59.924 -59.216 -60.589
(1.30) (1.88) (1.58) (1.03)
Observations 965 834 965 834
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.04
Source: “After the JD Study.” Sample includes lawyers working full time in law firms
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses, **significant at 1% , *significant at 5%
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Notice that the coe¢ cient for NYDC is not signicant in any of the specications.
This is somehow surprising since lawyers in these cities are known to work for long
hours; however, they might work more because their earnings are also higher. As
discussed above, my results show that lawyers with higher earnings work more hours
and that earnings in New York and Washington DC are higher than in other regions.
Therefore, the insignicant coe¢ cient of NYDC could be due to the fact that I am
already controlling for the lawyerssalary. Notice that although the results of Table
4 do not include the salary, they do include the size of the law rm, the size of the
law o¢ ce and the respondentsage, which seem to act as proxy variables for salary
in these specications.
As a nal remark, all the regressions are weighted using the national sample
selection probability weight. This is the weight recommended by the "After the JD
Study" in order to ensure a more representative sample when obtaining national
estimates.
The propensity score method
In order to estimate the average treatment e¤ect using propensity scores, rst
I estimate a probit model for court using the covariates of previous estimations.
This allows me to obtain the predicted likelihood of being assigned to court cases,
Pr(court), which I use as the control function. As shown in Table 6, court is still
positive and signicant when controlling for the propensity score.
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TABLE 12: Results with propensity score matching
 Hours of work           Hours beyond expected
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B)
court 3.911** 4.410** 3.647** 3.963**
(4.37) (4.82) (2.93) (2.98)
Pr(court) -11.753** -10.598** 0.221 -2.078
(4.10) (5.10) (0.09) (1.12)
Constant 53.173** 52.54** 2.574* 2.679**
(56.66) (62.64) (2.77) (3.25)
Observations 1002 859 1002 859
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
Source: “After the JD Study.” Sample includes lawyers working full time in law firms
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses, **significant at 1% , *significant at 5%
Covariates used to obtain Pr(court) are the same as used in Table 4 for each corresponding column
If salary is endogenous in this probit model, then I cannot consistently estimate
the average treatment e¤ect using this method. Thus, I exclude salary from the
control variables in these regressions.
Robustness discussion
In previous regressions I consider as lawyers representing cases in court those re-
spondents in my sample that reported to be rst or second chair in a case in at least
half of the cases they worked on over the past three months. Table 7 shows the re-
sults when using dummy variables for the possible responses of question 16.e instead
of using variable court. As can be seen in the table, responses "all" and "most" are
the driving force of the obtained results. Although the coe¢ cient is also positive for
the lawyers that reported to appear in court in some or half of the legal matters, the
e¤ect is clearer stronger for lawyers that appear in court very frequently.
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TABLE 13: Results with court split into four dummies
     Hours of work           Hours beyond expected
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B)
All 4.802** 5.666** 5.909* 6.386*
(3.02) (2.92) (2.26) (2.18)
Most 5.415** 6.367** 6.344** 6.517**
(4.79) (5.43) (4.45) (4.02)
Half 1.565 3.004 1.164 2.253
(0.95) (1.79) (0.66) (1.30)
Some 1.416 1.942 2.310** 2.620**
(1.66) (2.03) (3.83) (4.42)
Controls
Group 1 YES YES YES YES
Group 2 NO YES NO YES
Constant 31.377** 34.694** -2.319 10.685
(5.65) (4.38) (0.24) (0.77)
Observations 1002 859 1002 859
R-squared 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.05
Source: “After the JD Study” Sample includes lawyers working full time in law firms
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses, **significant at 1% , *significant at 5%
Group 1: size law firm, sq size law firm2, size office, age, age2, female with kids
Group 2: reputschool, GPA, GPAreput, NYDC
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Sample selection problem
This section studies a possible selection problem in the sample. The distinction
between lawyers representing cases in court and those who do not is possible through
a question of the survey that a part of the lawyers in the sample did not respond. In
particular, this question was not a part of the phone version of the survey.55 Although
all lawyers in the sample received a questionnaire in the mail, around 40 percent of
them were asked to respond over the phone after several unsuccessful attempts by
mail. Specically, from the 2282 respondents that work full time in law rms, variable
court is only available for 1272 of them.
This selection of the sample could create a bias in the results by distorting the
error term of in equations (3) and (4). Notice that the number of hours of work could
be correlated with the type of questionnaire (mail or phone). To test whether there
exists a sample selection problem, let sample be a dummy variable that identies
those lawyers who did not respond over the phone. That is:
sample =
8><>: 1 if response through questionnaire0 if response over the phone :
Hence, variable court is only available if sample is one. An initial analysis of the
sample selection problem shows that hours of work is not signicant in explaining
the likelihood of answering over the phone. That is, those who work more hours do
not seem to be more or less likely to respond the survey over the phone. Variables that
appear to be signicant in explaining phone are male, size of the law rm, and salary,
all of them with positive coe¢ cients. That is, female lawyers, lawyers from smaller
law rms or with lower earnings were more likely to answer the mail questionnaire.
55There was also a web version of the questionnaire available; however, only 12 respondents in the
sample used this version. Furthermore, of the sample of lawyers working full-time in law rms, only
four web respondents did not respond to the question related to variable court.
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I use a type II Tobit model to test for selection bias, following Heckman (1976).
Table 8 reports the results. Invmillsratio is the coe¢ cient of the estimated inverse
Mills ratios. None of the coe¢ cients is signicant and thus the null hypothesis of
no selection bias cannot be rejected. This result suggests that there is no sample
selection problem in the results of previous sections.
TABLE 14: Testing for sample selection bias
Hours of work Hours beyond expected
(1A) (1B) (2A) (2B)
court 3.631** 4.346** 3.844** 4.005**
(4.12) (4.36) (3.40) (3.03)
Invmillsratio -206.907 -227.694 -215.865 -277.307
(1.69) (1.55) (1.86) (2.00)
Controls
Group 1 YES YES YES YES
Group 2 NO YES NO YES
Constant 113.177* 125.952 83.136 122.414
(2.19) (2.08) (1.54) (1.84)
Observations 1002 859 1002 859
R-squared 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.04
Source: “After the JD Study.” Sample includes lawyers working full time in law firms
Notes: t-statistics are in parentheses, **significant at 1% , *significant at 5%
Group 1: size law firm, sq size law firm2, size office, age, age2, female with kids
Group 2: reputschool, GPA, GPAreput, NYDC.
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Conclusion
This paper nds that young lawyers representing cases in court work more hours
per week than other young lawyers working full-time in law rms. I obtain this result
using condential survey data of lawyers that passed the bar examination in 2000. The
results of the paper support the theoretical ndings in Ferrer (2009a). Being involved
in court cases seems to induce lawyers to work more hours. Intuitively, lawyers with
career concerns (as it seems the case for the case of young lawyers working full-time
in law rms), have additional incentives to win cases in court due to the prospect of
earnings growth upon showing to be a successful trial lawyer.
For further analysis, it is desirable to know more about the process used in law
rms to assign lawyers to represent cases in court; in particular, to know how this
process works as lawyers acquire experience. The second wave of the "After the JD
study," which will be available soon, will be helpful in this direction and may allow
me to use panel data estimation to conrm my ndings. In addition, the results
in this paper indicate that there is more to learn about how career concerns a¤ect
lawyersdecisions. Specically, it would be interesting to obtain data about personal
characteristics and working hours of lawyers matched to be opponents in court. With
this information I could use techniques of the empirical literature on tournaments to
study specic interactions between di¤erent types of lawyers. Finally, experimental
evidence could be very useful in complementing the results presented here.
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